Since you seem to be having trouble, here it is in full. And "open internet" is the phrase the FCC chose to use to describe net neutrality. But I’m sure you already knew that and are just playing dumb to try to obfuscate the issue. So is it your position that these orders hampered investment in the broadband sector?

A. Strong Rules That Protect Consumers from Past and Future Tactics that Threaten
the Open Internet

1. Clear, Bright-Line Rules
2. Because the record overwhelmingly supports adopting rules and demonstrates that three
   specific practices invariably harm the open Internet—Blocking, Throttling, and Paid Prioritization—this
   Order bans each of them, applying the same rules to both fixed and mobile broadband Internet access
   service.
3. No Blocking. Consumers who subscribe to a retail broadband Internet access service
   must get what they have paid for—access to all (lawful) destinations on the Internet. This essential and
   well-accepted principle has long been a tenet of Commission policy, stretching back to its landmark
   decision in Carterfone, which protected a customer’s right to connect a telephone to the monopoly
   telephone network.
   16
   Thus, this Order adopts a straightforward ban:
   A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such
   person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.
4. No Throttling. The 2010 open Internet rule against blocking contained an ancillary
   prohibition against the degradation of lawful content, applications, services, and devices, on the ground
   that such degradation would be tantamount to blocking. This Order creates a separate rule to guard
   against degradation targeted at specific uses of a customer’s broadband connection:
   A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is
   so engaged, shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet content,
   application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network
   management.
5. The ban on throttling is necessary both to fulfill the reasonable expectations of a
   customer who signs up for a broadband service that promises access to all of the lawful Internet, and to
   avoid gamesmanship designed to avoid the no-blocking rule by, for example, rendering an application
   effectively, but not technically, unusable. It prohibits the degrading of Internet traffic based on source,
   destination, or content.17 It also specifically prohibits conduct that singles out content competing with a
   broadband provider’s business model.
6. No Paid Prioritization. Paid prioritization occurs when a broadband provider accepts
   payment (monetary or otherwise) to manage its network in a way that benefits particular content,
   applications, services, or devices. To protect against “fast lanes,” this Order adopts a rule that establishes
   that:
   A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such
   person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid prioritization.

“Paid prioritization” refers to the management of a broadband provider’s network to
directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, including through use of
techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms of
preferential traffic management, either (a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or
otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.18

1. The record demonstrates the need for strong action. The Verizon court itself noted that
   broadband networks have “powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for
   excluding their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users.”19
   Mozilla, among many
   such commenters, explained that “[p]rioritization . . . inherently creates fast and slow lanes.”20
   Although
   there are arguments that some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial, the practical difficulty is
   this: the threat of harm is overwhelming,21 case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for individual
   consumers or edge providers, and there is no practical means to measure the extent to which edge
   innovation and investment would be chilled. And, given the dangers, there is no room for a blanket
   exception for instances where consumer permission is buried in a service plan—the threats of consumer
   deception and confusion are simply too great. 22
2. No Unreasonable Interference or Unreasonable Disadvantage to Consumers
   or Edge Providers
3. The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have both the incentive
   and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge providers and consumers. As gatekeepers,
   they can block access altogether; they can target competitors, including competitors to their own video
   services; and they can extract unfair tolls. Such conduct would, as the Commission concluded in 2010,
   “reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network
   infrastructure.”23
   In other words, when a broadband provider acts as a gatekeeper, it actually chokes
   consumer demand for the very broadband product it can supply.
4. The bright-line bans on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization will go a long way to
   preserve the virtuous cycle. But not all the way. Gatekeeper power can be exercised through a variety of
   technical and economic means, and without a catch-all standard, it would be that, as Benjamin Franklin
   said, “a little neglect may breed great mischief.”24
   Thus, the Order adopts the following standard:
   Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as
   such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably
   disadvantage (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access
   service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of their choice, or
   (ii) edge providers’ ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices
   available to end users. Reasonable network management shall not be considered a
   violation of this rule.
5. This “no unreasonable interference/disadvantage” standard protects free expression, thus
   fulfilling the congressional policy that “the Internet offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
   discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”25

And the standard will permit considerations of asserted benefits of innovation as well as threatened harm
to end users and edge providers.

1. Enhanced Transparency
2. The Commission’s 2010 transparency rule, upheld by the Verizon court, remains in full
   effect:
   A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly
   disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices,
   performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient
   for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content,
   application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet
   offerings.26
3. Today’s Order reaffirms the importance of ensuring transparency, so that consumers are
   fully informed about the Internet access they are purchasing and so that edge providers have the
   information they need to understand whether their services will work as advertised. To do that, the Order
   builds on the strong foundation established in 2010 and enhances the transparency rule for both end users
   and edge providers, including by adopting a requirement that broadband providers always must disclose
   promotional rates, all fees and/or surcharges, and all data caps or data allowances; adding packet loss as a
   measure of network performance that must be disclosed; and requiring specific notification to consumers
   that a “network practice” is likely to significantly affect their use of the service. Out of an abundance of
   caution and in response to a request by the American Cable Association, we also adopt a temporary
   exemption from these enhancements for small providers (defined for the purposes of the temporary
   exception as providers with 100,000 or fewer subscribers), and we direct our Consumer & Governmental
   Affairs Bureau to adopt an Order by December 15, 2015 concerning whether to make the exception
   permanent and, if so, the appropriate definition of “small.” Lastly, we create for all providers a “safe
   harbor” process for the format and nature of the required disclosure to consumers, which we believe will
   result in more effective presentation of consumer-focused information by broadband providers.
4. Scope of the Rules
5. The open Internet rules described above apply to both fixed and mobile broadband
   Internet access service. Consistent with the 2010 Order, today’s Order applies its rules to the consumer-
   facing service that broadband networks provide, which is known as “broadband Internet access service”27
   (BIAS) and is defined to be:
   A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit
   data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any
   capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications
   service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any
   service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service
   described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in
   this Part.
6. As in 2010, BIAS does not include enterprise services, virtual private network services,
   hosting, or data storage services. Further, we decline to apply the open Internet rules to premises
   operators to the extent they may be offering broadband Internet access service as we define it today.
7. In defining this service we make clear that we are responding to the Verizon court’s
   conclusion that broadband providers “furnish a service to edge providers” (and that this service was being
   treated as common carriage per se). As discussed further below, we make clear that broadband Internet
   access service encompasses this service to edge providers. Broadband providers sell retail customers the
   ability to go anywhere (lawful) on the Internet. Their representation that they will transport and deliver
   traffic to and from all or substantially all Internet endpoints includes the promise to transmit traffic to and
   from those Internet endpoints back to the user.
8. Interconnection. BIAS involves the exchange of traffic between a broadband Internet
   access provider and connecting networks. The representation to retail customers that they will be able to
   reach “all or substantially all Internet endpoints” necessarily includes the promise to make the
   interconnection arrangements necessary to allow that access.
9. As discussed below, we find that broadband Internet access service is a
   “telecommunications service” and subject to sections 201, 202, and 208 (along with key enforcement
   provisions). As a result, commercial arrangements for the exchange of traffic with a broadband Internet
   access provider are within the scope of Title II, and the Commission will be available to hear disputes
   raised under sections 201 and 202 on a case-by-case basis: an appropriate vehicle for enforcement where
   disputes are primarily over commercial terms and that involve some very large corporations, including
   companies like transit providers and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), that act on behalf of smaller
   edge providers.
10. But this Order does not apply the open Internet rules to interconnection. Three factors
    are critical in informing this approach to interconnection. First, the nature of Internet traffic, driven by
    massive consumption of video, has challenged traditional arrangements—placing more emphasis on the
    use of CDNs or even direct connections between content providers (like Netflix or Google) and last-mile
    broadband providers. Second, it is clear that consumers have been subject to degradation resulting from
    commercial disagreements,
    28 perhaps most notably in a series of disputes between Netflix and large last-
    mile broadband providers. But, third, the causes of past disruption and—just as importantly—the
    potential for future degradation through interconnection disputes—are reflected in very different
    narratives in the record.
11. While we have more than a decade’s worth of experience with last-mile practices, we
    lack a similar depth of background in the Internet traffic exchange context. Thus, we find that the best
    approach is to watch, learn, and act as required, but not intervene now, especially not with prescriptive
    rules. This Order—for the first time—provides authority to consider claims involving interconnection, a
    process that is sure to bring greater understanding to the Commission.
12. Reasonable Network Management. As with the 2010 rules, this Order contains an
    exception for reasonable network management, which applies to all but the paid prioritization rule (which,
    by definition, is not a means of managing a network):
    A network management practice is a practice that has a primarily technical network
    management justification, but does not include other business practices. A network
    management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and tailored to achieving a
    legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network
    architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.
13. Recently, significant concern has arisen when mobile providers’ have attempted to justify
    certain practices as reasonable network management practices, such as applying speed reductions to
    customers using “unlimited data plans” in ways that effectively force them to switch to price plans with
    less generous data allowances. For example, in the summer of 2014, Verizon announced a change to its
    “unlimited” data plan for LTE customers, which would have limited the speeds of LTE customers using
    grandfathered “unlimited” plans once they reached a certain level of usage each month. Verizon briefly
    described this change as within the scope of “reasonable network management,” before changing course
    and withdrawing the change.
14. With mobile broadband service now subject to the same rules as fixed broadband service,
    the Order expressly recognizes that evaluation of network management practices will take into account
    the additional challenges involved in the management of mobile networks, including the dynamic
    conditions under which they operate. It also recognizes the specific network management needs of other
    technologies, such as unlicensed Wi-Fi networks.
15. Non-Broadband Internet Access Service Data Services. The 2010 rules included an
    exception for “specialized services.” This Order likewise recognizes that some data services—like
    facilities-based VoIP offerings, heart monitors, or energy consumption sensors—may be offered by a
    broadband provider but do not provide access to the Internet generally. The term “specialized services”
    can be confusing because the critical point is not whether the services are “specialized;” it is that they are
    not broadband Internet access service. IP-services that do not travel over broadband Internet access
    service, like the facilities-based VoIP services used by many cable customers, are not within the scope of
    the open Internet rules, which protect access or use of broadband Internet access service. Nonetheless,
    these other non-broadband Internet access service data services could be provided in a manner that
    undermines the purpose of the open Internet rules and that will not be permitted. The Commission
    expressly reserves the authority to take action if a service is, in fact, providing the functional equivalent of
    broadband Internet access service or is being used to evade the open Internet rules. The Commission will
    vigilantly watch for such abuse, and its actions will be aided by the existing transparency requirement that
    non-broadband Internet access service data services be disclosed.
16. Enforcement
17. The Commission may enforce the open Internet rules through investigation and the
    processing of complaints (both formal and informal). In addition, the Commission may provide guidance
    through the use of enforcement advisories and advisory opinions, and it will appoint an ombudsperson.
    In order to provide the Commission with additional understanding, particularly of technical issues, the
    Order delegates to the Enforcement Bureau the authority to request a written opinion from an outside
    technical organization or otherwise to obtain objective advice from industry standard-setting bodies or
    similar organizations.