As we wrote over the summer, one of Okularity's targets was the well known Paper Magazine, put out by the publisher Enttech Media Group. Enttech said that Okularity sought to have Paper Magazine's Instagram account shut down, and then offered to "settle," demanding a pretty massive sum in the process. The lawsuit alleged violations of DMCA 512(f) which is the (unfortunately) mostly toothless part of the DMCA that is supposed to allow those on the receiving end of bogus DMCA takedowns to fight back. In practice, however, courts have mostly rejected all 512(f) claims, or made it so they're basically impossible to do anything useful with. Because of that, any time we see a 512(f) claim that has legs, we pay attention.

The original complaint also tried to argue that Okularity violated the RICO statute, and long time readers here know what we think of RICO claims. While there did appear to be some unauthorized practice of law happening, there didn't seem to be nearly enough to make a RICO claim -- because there's basically never enough to make a RICO claim. We predicted that the RICO claim would get tossed out, but that the 512(f) claim might live on.

Turns out, we were right.

While the case has had some twists and turns, this week the judge tossed out the RICO claims, but is allowing the 512(f) claims to move forward. Nicolini and Okularity had argued that Enttech's lawyer, Robert Tauler, should face Rule 11 sanctions for ignoring evidence regarding their fair use analysis, but the court rejected those as well. Tauler did have to file a third amended complaint, however, to get to this point, as the court did find the first two complaints somewhat deficient.

But on the key point -- 512(f) -- the court notes that the case can continue, even under the confused Lenz standard in the 9th Circuit, that basically said (1) DMCA filers have to "subjectively" consider fair use to be a "good faith" filing, but (2) automated takedowns may be okay... because we say so. Nikolini and Okularity argued that they do consider fair use before sending notices, while Enttech argued the notices appeared to be totally automated. The court basically says -- Enttech has met the initial burden that the case can move forward.

One key point of contention in this: the takedown letters sent by Okularity do contain a "discussion of infringement and fair use," Okularity claims that shows that it does consider fair use. Enttech responded that every single notice Okularity sends contains an exact copy of this discussion, suggesting no actual analysis is done, and it's just a cut-and-paste. This point is what the judge focused in on:

ENTTech’s allegation that the DMCA notices contained an analysis of infringement and fair use presents a question of first impression with respect to the standard for pleading a claim under § 512(f). Is it sufficient for ENTTech to allege that, notwithstanding the takedown notices’ explicit and extensive fairuse analysis, Defendants did not actually or sufficiently consider fair use before issuing the takedown notices? At first blush, the fact that the DMCA takedown notices contain fair-use analyses—even if those analyses are identical and pro forma—seems to satisfy the requirement to “consider” fair use before issuing a takedown notice. See Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1154. The presence of the purported fair-use analysis in each takedown notice also distinguishes this case from Lenz where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant did not consider fair use at all. Cf. id.

Is ENTTech required to allege additional facts, in view of the appearance that Defendants considered fair use? For example, must ENTTech allege evidentiary facts concerning Defendants’ analytical process or subjective state of mind (the type of facts which, in most cases, are not available to a plaintiff before discovery is taken)? Does the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard require ENTTech to aver its own analysis of fair use to support an inference that Defendants merely paid “lip service” to the consideration of fair use? Cf. id. at 1163. Having considered these questions, the Court concludes that ENTTech’s allegations in the TAC are sufficient at this stage of the litigation.

The court points out that the ruling in Lenz supports allowing this case to move forward, saying that it's a factual question whether or not the takedown notice sender had a "good faith belief" that the notice was legit, and therefore, it's up to a jury to decide.

Although Lenz involved a motion for summary judgment, that decision is nevertheless instructive with respect to the issue presently before the Court. Lenz supports the conclusion that the question of whether a copyright owner formed a subjective good faith belief that an alleged infringer’s copying of the work did not constitute fair use is, in most instances, a factual issue that is not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. “Because the DMCA requires consideration of fair use prior to sending a takedown notification,” the Ninth Circuit held that “a jury must determine whether [the defendant’s] actions were sufficient to form a subjective good faith belief about the [allegedly infringing] video’s fair use or lack thereof.” Id. at 1154. In response to the arguments in the dissenting opinion regarding the propriety of granting summary judgment, the Lenz panel majority explained that the relevant question was “whether the analysis [the defendant] did conduct of the [alleged infringing material] was sufficient, not to conclusively establish as a matter of law that the . . . use of the [copyrighted material] was fair, but to form a subjective good faith belief that the video was infringing on [the] copyright.” Id. at 1154 n.3.

Therefore, because it is generally a factual issue whether the analysis that the defendant did conduct of the alleged infringing material was sufficient, see id., it necessarily follows that to plead a claim under § 512(f), it is enough for ENTTech to allege that Defendants did not consider fair use (sufficiently or at all) before issuing the takedown notices. And that is exactly what ENTTech alleges here. Requiring ENTTech to allege more would effectively impose a heightened pleading standard, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and no authority holds that claims under § 512(f) must be pleaded with particularity. Thus, although it may be advisable for a plaintiff like ENTTech to aver additional facts (such as its own analysis of fair use) to support the allegation that a defendant’s fair use analysis was merely pro forma, the Court cannot conclude that ENTTech is required to plead such facts in order to state a plausible claim for relief under § 512(f).

In the grand scheme of things, this is only a small step forward, but it is a step forward for 512(f) -- a part of the law that rarely ever sees any positive news. This doesn't mean that Enttech is likely to win, but it does mean that the courts may crack the door open just ever so slightly in letting people and companies fight back against abusive DMCA notices.

Hansmeier got into the copyright enforcement business thinking it would produce a steady stream of easy cash. He and his associates went after people who allegedly downloaded porn, thinking that people would pay anything asked to avoid having their sexual predilections exposed to friends, family, and the public at large.

When that didn't work as well as Hansmeier had hoped, he went further. He and his associates produced their own porn (but didn't star in it, thankfully) and served it up to piracy services in order to produce a steady stream of defendants. (These home productions were never made available for legal viewing. They only existed as lawsuit bait.) It all ended in a criminal indictment and a guilty plea by Hansmeier, who had recently branched out into ADA trolling in his home state of Minnesota.

That brings us to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has affirmed everything Hansmeier wishes wasn't happening to him, like his 168-month prison sentence for fraud and money laundering and a $1.5 million restitution order.

The court recounts the sordid details of the long-running scam, including the numerous shell companies created to hide the origin of copyrighted films, as well as the profits (and losses) of the law firm supposedly representing a handful of porn-producing clients. It details the use of "ruse defendants" to avoid courts' limitation of discovery requests after judges started figuring out just how shady Hansmeier and Prenda Law were. What began as sanctions and subpoena denials slowly and steadily turned into disciplinary action from state bars and, finally, a criminal investigation that resulted in guilty pleas by both Hansmeier and his partner, John Steele.

Hansmeier doesn't want to be on the hook for $1.5 million in restitution. But the Appeals Court [PDF] doesn't see anything that warrants a reversal of the lower court's order. As it points out, Hansmeier still comes out ahead, even after being ordered to pay back $1.5 million of his illegal takings.

Based on his review of Hansmeier and Steele’s financial documents, Agent Kary estimated that, between 2010 and 2013, the alleged infringers Hansmeier and Steele targeted paid over $6 million total in settlements. Agent Kary then summarized a spreadsheet the FBI created to estimate the proper restitution amount. The spreadsheet did not include all of the settlement money that came in over this time period. Rather, it was limited to payments made after April 2011, which is when there was evidence that Hansmeier and Steele posted to file-sharing websites a movie to which they held the copyright—in other words, when, under the government’s theory, their fraud scheme began—and to payments that he could link to specific victims. Based on these parameters, he calculated a restitution figure of $1,541,527.37.

The Appeals Court notes Hansmeier's actions didn't just screw over internet users and defraud Prenda's clients and partners. The fraud also affected the courts handling Prenda's copyright cases. Had judges known what Hansmeier was engaged in, they would have rejected discovery requests and handed down sanctions even sooner than they already did.

It does, however, reject the government's argument that Hansmeier waived his right to appeal the judgment. The court says he can appeal. But it ultimately doesn't matter. The figure derived from the government's inspection of Hansmeier's criminal activity is as close to accurate as it gets without straying from the "actual loss" guidelines. As noted above, the government was able to find documentation for $6 million in possibly fraudulently obtained settlements. The court only ordered the return of a quarter of this amount. That's good enough for the Eighth Circuit, which says Hansmeier gets to keep serving his time and watch whatever assets he has left start getting liquidated to pay off this order.

Here, the government met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the $1,541,527.37 loss total was attributable solely to settlement payments from the fraud scheme. [...] In coming to his final loss amount, Agent Kary included only settlement payments from April 2011 on, when Hansmeier and Steele directed an associate to upload a movie called Sexual Obsession, which they held the copyright to and which they used in their fraudulent lawsuits, to file sharing websites. Agent Kary explained that Sexual Obsession became the “go-to movie as far as gaining settlements from individuals.” He said that other movies were not a “significant” source of profit from that point on, constituting just “a few [payments] trickling in here and there.” Considering this information, the district court characterized potential payments from “legitimate” lawsuits over this period as making up no “more than potentially a negligible amount” of the money Hansmeier and Steele received.

Even more narrowing of the amount followed. But the smoking gun here is Hansmeier's own testimony, which is perhaps more damning than the results of the government's investigation. Even with this in play, Hansmeier is still only "out" half of what he took from others illegally.

Finally, Hansmeier himself acknowledged in his plea agreement that, between 2011 and 2014, he and Steele “received more than $3,000,000 in fraudulent proceeds” from their lawsuits.

The $1.5 million judgment stands. The man who helped ruin the lives of dozens of people will have to continue to deal with his multiple self-inflicted wounds. Hopefully, he'll be a cautionary tale that will dissuade future IP enforcement opportunists from engaging in litigation-adjacent get-rich-quick schemes that defraud the public and the court systems their tax dollars pay for.

Ashley Overbey chose not to remain silent. She sued the city after her call to report a burglary resulted in officers beating, tasing, verbally abusing, and then finally arresting her. She received a $63,000 settlement that came with strings attached. She yanked some strings in response to the city choosing to disparage her as "hostile" in its public statements about the lawsuit. After her public statements, the city decided she owed it $31,500 for opening her mouth.

Her case made its way to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court was not amused by the city's multiple arguments in favor of its extortion tactics.

[W]hen the government (1) makes a police-misconduct claimant’s silence about her claims a condition of settlement; (2) obtains the claimant’s promise of silence; (3) retains for itself the unilateral ability to determine whether the claimant has broken her promise; and (4) enforces the claimant’s promise by, in essence, holding her civilly liable to itself, there can be no serious doubt that the government has used its power in an effort to curb speech that is not to its liking.

It's a First Amendment violation. And an obvious one at that. The case has returned to the lower court and the district court is far less receptive of the government's arguments the second time around. (h/t Baltimore Sun)

On remand, the city argued it did not owe Overbey the other $31,500 it clawed back when she chose to speak up about the city's actions. Instead, it claimed the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations, leaving Overbey only the option of recovering nominal damages. And how nominal those damages are!

From the decision [PDF]:

Instead, it asserts the “better view” is that Ms. Overbey is only entitled to “nominal damages of one dollar” for an infringement of her First Amendment right to speak, “perhaps coupled with a formal declaration to that effect.”

Wrong, says the district court. The contract was violated by the city, thanks to its egregious First Amendment violations. Subtracting half the settlement caused damages to Overbey equal to the half the city withheld for her violation a contract that was unable to be enforced Constitutionally.

The City owes Ms. Overbey the other $31,500. By its conduct in unconstitutionally enforcing the now discredited clause, the City withheld half of the settlement proceeds. Thus, the civil rights violation caused $31,500 in economic harm.

Overbey will also be collecting interest accrued since October 8, 2014. The court has further comments on the city's inexcusable defense of its inexcusable settlement policy.

The City continues to defend its use of the non-disparagement clause and the “real and substantial questions presented” by facts that led to the settlement agreement in the first place. Therefore, it cites shock that “that the challenge would bear fruit” here and that the serendipity that allowed Ms. Overby’s claim to survive was akin to a “virtual lightning strike.” The seeming inference is that their illegal act should not be undone simply because no one thought, or even suspected, it was illegal at the time. Even if true, all this is beside the point. The City entered the settlement agreement it helped craft knowing that its severability provision contemplated this exact scenario: that a clause may be deemed “invalid, void and illegal,” and that it would subsequently be stricken from the agreement.

Almost six years after the city decided to punish Overbey for her refusal to remain silent, it will finally pay her what she's owed. Fortunately, future plaintiffs won't have to put up with this bullshit.

And, to be fair, the Chinese government has a point. It was extortionate. Trump told ByteDance it had to sell or TikTok would be blocked in the US. And while it didn't actually sell TikTok, it was forced at gunpoint into a deal that it appears it would not have made otherwise. And, of course, China holds all the leverage here because Trump is a ridiculously bad dealmaker. His "plan" flopped in that he didn't force a sale, and then to save face (and to help out one of his big donors) he gave the thumbs up to the Oracle non-purchase/hosting contract. It was already a weak move that everyone other than the dumbest of Trump's fans knows is a weak move by a President who swings the executive power bat like a toddler who just learned how to smash things.

So, of course China is going to move for a better deal. In the Chinese state-controlled English language outlet China Daily, the the Chinese government goes in for the kill.

What the United States has done to TikTok is almost the same as a gangster forcing an unreasonable and unfair business deal on a legitimate company.

It (correctly) calls out that the "national security" excuse that Trump used is an obvious fig leaf and hogwash for his real motives. Of course, it claims that it was really about the US wanting to kill foreign competition, when that's unlikely to be the case. It's got more to do with various culture wars the President feels like fighting, rather than actually leading in the midst of a pandemic.

The editorial claims that even with this half-assed Oracle deal, it's a move towards the US using mafioso techniques to gain control over TikTok, and says that China has no reason to approve the deal on its end.

It is not the first time the US has played such dirty tricks to bully foreign companies in order to either destroy them or take them over.

China has no reason to give the green light to such a deal, which is dirty and unfair and based on bullying and extortion. If the US gets its way, it will continue to do the same with other foreign companies. Giving in to the unreasonable demands of the US would mean the doom of the Chinese company ByteDance.

Again, this is almost certainly just more posturing. And, ridiculously, what's it's likely to come down to is some sort of stupid diplomatic discussion between the US State Department and counterparts in China to come up with something that will make the deal work -- which means it will almost be an already worse deal than it currently is, with no redeeming points whatsoever, and what little Trump "got" out of the deal will not just be whittled down to nothing, but probably less than nothing.

Instead, Microsoft had to call up the President and grovel before him, before he apparently told the company it had until September 15th to work out a deal, and if no deal was made by then, he'd again "ban" TikTok (again, an almost certainly unconstitutional move that would not work). Still, it would be a mess, and I'm sure TikTok and ByteDance (the company's current owner) knows that it's probably best to take what it can get from Microsoft while it can. Of course, Microsoft also knows that it's in a good position because ByteDance has a ticking time bomb on its hands, and the value of TikTok could decrease drastically on September 15th if no deal is made. Even if a ban is unconstitutional, fighting it will take time and money.

Also, it's not clear if there would be much competition for TikTok from anyone other than Microsoft. I mean, Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg would love to buy it, but pretty much everyone knows that there's no way in hell that would get approved by the Justice Department. Even if Facebook weren't already facing a shit ton of antitrust scrutiny from Congress, the FTC, and state Attorneys General, the Bill Barr DOJ has made it clear that it will abuse antitrust to hurt companies Trump is mad at. And contrary to some conspiracy theories, Trump and friends still insist that Facebook is "biased" against them (it's not). So that wipes out most of the large internet companies that would actually have the capital to buy TikTok. There could be a surprise buyer, but it remains a fairly limited market, at best.

Still, things went from just stupid to downright bizarre on Monday when President Trump announced that he thought most of the money from a TikTok acquisition should go to the US Treasury:

"The United States should get a very large percentage of that price, because we're making it possible," Mr Trump said.

"It would come from the sale, which nobody else would be thinking about but me, but that's the way I think, and I think it's very fair," he added.

This is dumb on so many levels. First of all, people have been discussing the possibility of ByteDance having to sell TikTok to get away from questions about its Chinese ownership since long before Trump ever heard of TikTok. So the idea that it's only because of him is just yet another one of his narcissistic fever dreams. Second, you're not "making it possible" any more that the local organized crime fixer "makes it possible" for your restaurant to not burn down if you pay up your protection money. That's called extortion and it's not the kind of thing that the President should be advocating for. Third, it's incredibly stupid because even just saying that gives the Chinese government a ton of ammunition, as they started deploying almost immediately:

The state-run China Daily newspaper said on Tuesday that Beijing would not accept the "theft" of a Chinese technology company.

It also warned in an editorial that China had "plenty of ways to respond if the administration carries out its planned smash and grab".

Considering how much US officials have been whining and screaming about supposed Chinese attempts to "steal American intellectual property," giving the Chinese government a talking point to argue that the US government "does the same thing" is just a huge diplomatic stupidity.

Everything about this story is ridiculous, but it's 2020, and you always know that President Trump can take a stupid story and make it stupider.

The settlement is pretty straightforward. Brady agrees not to send any more bogus DMCA notices to YouTube and also agrees not to "misrepresent or mask" his identity on any Google property. He also agreed to pay $25,000 to Google, which probably about covers their legal bills for bringing this case. Brady also released an apology statement, which suggests he may have sent more bogus DMCA notices than were included in the lawsuit.

“I, Christopher L. Brady, admit that I sent dozens of notices to YouTube falsely claiming that material uploaded by YouTube users infringed my copyrights. I apologize to the YouTube users that I directly impacted by my actions, to the YouTube community, and to YouTube itself.”

Of course, while it's good to see such an apology and settlement, it still doesn't change the fact that bogus DMCA notices happen all the time. While Brady may have been more extreme and more blatant than most, there's still a huge problem with a law that creates a situation that mere accusation will often get content removed.

This is a thing in Alabama. Sheriffs are allowed to use leftover food funds (obtained from both state and federal sources) as a personal source of income. Use it they did. One sheriff bought himself a house with the "excess" funds. The sheriff Ana Franklin replaced was so notorious for cutting food costs, he earned the nickname "Sheriff Corndog."

Sheriff Franklin went further than the man she replaced. She went after a whistleblower who caught her taking $160,000 from the prisoner food account and handing $150,000 of that to a shady car dealership run by a convicted felon.

Franklin also targeted the whistleblower -- former Morgan County jail warden Leon Bradley -- with bogus criminal charges. To do so, the sheriff's office went after a local blogger who was publishing the warden's allegations, paying the blogger's grandson to install a keylogger on her computer. Using evidence gleaned from the keylogger, the sheriff then went after the former warden, hitting Bradley with misdemeanor government records tampering. These charges were dropped by the presiding judge -- the one that had issued the search warrant -- who said the Sheriff's office had "deliberately misled the court" to "cover up their deception and criminal actions."

Bradley sued the Sheriff and a handful of deputies. The lower court refused to grant immunity to any of the Sheriff's Office defendants on any of the 14 counts in Bradley's lawsuit. Not only was qualified immunity denied, but so were the state-level forms, including state-agent immunity and absolute immunity.

The defendants appealed. The Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court has taken a look at the allegations and is no more willing to extend immunity to Sheriff Franklin and her deputies. (h/t Eric Goldman)

The sheriff hoped to have the state's expansive absolute immunity doctrine applied to her abuse of power, but the appeals court isn't interested in turning Alabama state law into a shield for bad cops. The sheriff tried to persuade the court that anything done while officers were on the clock cannot be sued over. Yeah, we're not doing that, says the Eleventh Circuit [PDF].

According to the defendants, even if their activities were ill-intended, the actions occurred during the course of police investigations, evidence seizures, and the like, such that absolute immunity still applies. This view requires an extraordinarily broad view of absolute immunity that would effectively immunize any conduct when the sheriff flashes his or her badge. The district court correctly rejected this view because Alabama law does not provide such infinite immunity. The allegations in the complaint extend well beyond the negligent mishandling of an investigation or sloppiness in executing a search warrant, or any other number of activities that could fairly advance the objectives of the sheriff, even if the sheriff’s actions suffered from procedural defects. Rather, the alleged activities paint a picture of a lengthy conspiracy to defraud the taxpayer, use public funds for personal gain, and punish anyone who threatened to publicize their activities. As the district court noted, the defendants cannot explain how these allegations would fit within the scope of their employment.

The same goes for the defendants' attempt to have qualified immunity applied to their actions. The working theory here is the same: that anything done with a badge out while on the clock shouldn't be subject to civil lawsuits.The Appeals Court rejects this attempt to expand immunity protections.

The defendants urge us to find that Bradley’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The district court rejected this argument, finding that the defendants were unable to meet their burden of showing that their alleged acts fell within the scope of their discretionary authority. Rather, Bradley alleged that the defendants had engaged in extortion to collect information on him, then knowingly violated the law by lying to a judge to secure a search warrant.

[...]

[T]heir argument is unworkable in practice. If qualified immunity applies to these allegations, then it is difficult to envision any limiting principle, similar to the problem noted in the absolute immunity analysis, where any malfeasance does not receive immunity owing to the presence of a sheriff’s badge.

There's no good faith shown here either. Immunity protects the actions of "reasonable" officers. Nothing here approaches "reasonable."

It is harder to think of a better example of knowingly violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights than the allegation, which we are bound to accept as true, that the defendants facilitated the installation of an unauthorized keylogger on Bradley’s computer, misled a judge to secure an invalid search warrant, then raided Bradley’s home. Said another way, these allegations are the antithesis of the type for which one might be entitled to “good faith” immunity.

The lawsuit lives and Sheriff Ana Franklin will have to face all 14 counts brought against her. The same for two of her deputies. The sheriff could have stopped starving inmates and enriching herself at their expense, but instead she decided to engage in extortion and illegal searches. It seems like corruption may be the only thing she knows. Too bad for her that she sucks at it.

It appears that YouTube was actually paying attention, and it has now filed a 512(f) claim against at least one of the people doing this, a guy in Omaha, Nebraska named Christopher Brady -- who probably is not having the best week. You can read the complaint here. It's pretty straightforward:

Defendant, Christopher L. Brady (“Brady), has repeatedly attempted to harass and extort money from YouTube content creators through bogus allegations of copyright infringement. This lawsuit seeks to hold him accountable for that misconduct, and for the damage he has caused to YouTube.

In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (the “DMCA”), to provide a framework for addressing claims of online copyright infringement. In general, the DMCA immunizes online service providers from claims of copyright infringement based on materials uploaded to the services by users, if the services promptly remove allegedly infringing materials upon receipt of notices from copyright holders. Through these notices, the content of which is statutorily prescribed, copyright holders are able to secure the expeditious removal of allegedly infringing materials from online services without the need to prove a claim of infringement in court. Users that receive infringement notices they contend are incorrect may file a counter notification by providing their name, address, and telephone number, and consent to service of process by the complaining party.

Congress also recognized that these “takedown notices” could be used maliciously to secure the removal of content that was not legitimately claimed to be infringing. Accordingly, it included a provision in the DMCA authorizing those aggrieved by fraudulent notices to bring an action against the sender for damages. This is such an action.

The complaint lays out Brady's behavior in fairly great detail.

Defendant Brady targeted the YouTube accounts of Kenzo and ObbyRaidz, among others, in an extortionate scheme.

In January 2019, Defendant Brady, using several falsified identities, sent YouTube multiple notices of alleged copyright infringement pursuant to the DMCA, claiming that two videos uploaded by Kenzo and two videos uploaded by ObbyRaidz supposedly infringed copyrights that he owned.

Defendant Brady’s notices of alleged infringement included the various representations required under the DMCA. Brady identified the specific locations of the videos posted by Kenzo and ObbyRaidz. He represented that he was the original creator of those videos, that he held the copyright to them, that the videos posted by Kenzo and ObbyRaidz infringed his copyrights, and that each of his notices was accurate. And he certified: “UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I am authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.” Brady even included links to other copies of the videos in question as “proof” that he, rather than Kenzo and ObbyRaidz, had created them.

Defendant Brady’s notices of alleged infringement were fraudulent. The videos posted by Kenzo and ObbyRaidz that Brady identified in his notices did not infringe any copyright supposedly owned by Brady. Brady knew that at the time he sent the notices. Brady also knew that did not hold the copyright to the videos he identified as his own in the notices. His certifications under penalty of perjury in the notices were knowingly false.

Defendant Brady sent the notices of alleged infringement for the improper purpose of inducing YouTube to remove the identified videos and assess unwarranted copyright strikes on the Kenzo and ObbyRaidz accounts.

The complaint goes on to note -- as we had in our article earlier this year -- the blackmail messages sent to the account creators, noting that once these were publicized, YouTube investigated the claims, removed the strikes on the user accounts and restored the videos. However, it appears that Brady decided to try again -- though this time it appears that it was as part of some larger fight, in which Brady was trying to expose a YouTube user's home address, likely for swatting (the user was swatted a few days later). It's interesting to see that part of YouTube's investigation of the matter apparently involved observing others' Twitter accounts:

A review of Defendant Brady’s and Cxlvxn’s Twitter accounts from this time period suggests they were engaged in some sort of online dispute and it appears that Brady sent the notices of alleged infringement for the improper purpose of inducing Cxlvxn to submit a counter notification, thereby exposing his home address.

Cxlvxn submitted a counter notification on July 4th, 2019. On July 10th, he announced via Twitter that he had been the victim of a swatting scheme that day. “Swatting” is the act of making a bogus call to emergency services in an attempt to bring about the dispatch of a large number of armed police officers to a particular address.

Given the timing of (i) Defendant Brady’s online dispute with Cxlvxn, (ii) Brady’s false copyright claims against Cxlvxn; (iii) Brady’s receipt of Cxlvxn’s true home address via Cxlvxn’s counter-notification; and (iv) the reported swatting incident, it appears Brady used the personal information gained through his abuse of the DMCA process to engage in swatting.

Given this, it's possible that Brady may soon be in a lot deeper shit than a 512(f) civil complaint. Law enforcement often can't go after swatters since they're hard to track down. But if YouTube has done the work for them...

Either way, it's interesting to see YouTube trying to breathe some life back into 512(f). This case seems perfectly made for just such a thing. If this case can't get a 512(f) win, then no case can. YouTube is asking for Brady to cover their legal fees (which I'm sure are substantial), as well as an injunction barring Brady from submitting more bogus DMCA notices. It's interesting to note that they're not even looking to bar him from YouTube entirely -- just from submitting bogus DMCA takedowns. It's also seeking damages for the time and effort the company had to put into dealing with his bogus DMCA takedowns. (Update: I had missed this last bit initially, but have now updated the post to reflect that).

While Brady may end up in deeper hot water over the swatting claims (should prosecutors suddenly take an interest in him over this), from a purely copyright standpoint, it would be nice to see 512(f) succeed in one case before we reach the heat death of the universe.

However, there are continued efforts at passing laws to deal with this issue -- even if the attempts to do so mostly appear to be unconstitutional. We've also pointed out that these laws potentially criminalize behavior most people don't think of as "revenge porn," which could represent a real issue.

And that brings us to the case of Whitney Cummings, a comedian/actress/producer, who is getting some attention this week after responding to a blackmail threat from someone, asking for money to not release a photo that apparently shows her exposed nipple (which she had accidentally, and very briefly, included in an Instagram story). Someone sent her a version of the photo and asked how much not to post it (in this screenshot the naughty bits are cropped, and even though she's now released it, I'm not linking to the image because, be better than that).

In posting it, Cummings notes that "They all must think I’m way more famous than I am, but they also must think I’m way more easily intimidated than I am. If anyone is gonna make money or likes off my nipple, it’s gonna be me. So here it all is, you foolish dorks." Lots of people are, rightly, coming out to support her -- and are sending embarrassing pictures of themselves to her.

She does claim that others are threatening to blackmail her by saying that they've got access to her iCloud, but notes:

I'll be honest, I stand by most of my nudes. Frankly I'm way more embarrassed by all the inspirational quotes I've screen grabbed.

And, later, she posted those embarrassing screen grabs.

One other interesting note: she points out that she won't reveal who's been trying to extort her, because:

I'm not posting the names of the people trying to extort me because some of them might be dumb kids. I wouldn't want the stupid ideas I had when I was a teenager to follow me around forever or else every time someone Googled me, they'd see me shoplifting a NO FEAR t-shirt. .

This is a good example of confronting awfulness and turning it into something... better. I wouldn't say it's a "good" outcome, because it's not at all clear that Cummings wanted this image out otherwise. And so I'm left to thinking about various attempts to create revenge porn laws. Would they ding this photo itself as revenge porn? Yes, Cummings herself eventually posted it, but only under the threat of having it leaked by some jackass if she didn't pay up. One could easily argue that that situation is far from consensual. Some of the laws might say it doesn't violate the law -- since Cummings posting it herself is a sign of consent. But how would you square that with cases where these same kinds of idiots threaten to release photos or information on women if they don't "send nudes." In those cases, many young women do, in fact, send nude pictures, feeling it's their only way out -- but that's (again) very, very, very far from "consensual."

This is not to argue one way or the other on this -- other than to note that there are tough calls on this, and attempts to create laws against "revenge porn" could lead to situations where Cummings' own actions might be seen to violate those laws, even though it's a case of her taking control over a shitty situation and flipping the script a bit.

So perhaps this following story shouldn't be seen as too much of a surprise (though, I imagine it was a surprise to whoever hacked Radiohead frontman Thom Yorke). As noted in that parenthetical, someone apparently hacked Yorke, and somehow got access to a set of 18 minidiscs of somewhat random/eclectic material that Yorke had recorded in the 1996/97 timeframe, when the band was working on its seminal Ok Computer album. The hackers apparently then asked Yorke/Radiohead for $150,000 not to release the material. The band chose not to give in to the hackers, who then did leak the material. However, soon after the material was leaked, the band announced (via Radiohead guitarist Jonny Greenwood's Instagram) that the band was now officially "releasing" that material on Bandcamp for £18 (or more) and donating any funds raised to Extinction Rebellion (a climate change advocacy group).

Greenwood's writeup -- titled "Walter Sobchak vs Bunny's toe, as an amusing nod towards the extortion attempt in The Big Lebowski -- is worth reading:

Subject: Walter Sobchak vs Bunny's toe

We got hacked last week - someone stole Thom's minidisk archive from around the time of OK Computer, and reportedly demanded $150,000 on threat of releasing it.

So instead of complaining - much - or ignoring it, we're releasing all 18 hours on Bandcamp in aid of Extinction Rebellion. Just for the next 18 days. So for £18 you can find out if we should have paid that ransom.

Never intended for public consumption (though some clips did reach the cassette in the OK Computer reissue) it's only tangentially interesting. And very, very long. Not a phone download. Rainy out, isn't it though?

And yes, the file is quite large -- approaching 2GB -- and the band itself says it's not that interesting. But, of course, fans are interested, because that's what fandom is about. In fact, it's quite interesting to see that a bunch of fans have put together a crowdsourced Google Doc creating a track listing and annotation of what's in the files (though, they also have to explain that they weren't the ones who hacked Yorke's stuff in the first place). The notes themselves are kind of interesting:

As with all such things, this could easily have turned into the band just complaining about a situation that basically everyone agrees is unfair and unpleasant. However, Radiohead, of all bands, appears to have been quick to turn what is undoubtedly a crappy situation into a positive one that both supports a charity they like and builds tremendous goodwill with fans (while making the hackers look awful).

There's a key point in all of this that is worth noting, and it's one that we've tried to make for years about piracy: we're not arguing that piracy is somehow a good thing. However, we have argued that piracy happens. The question is how you respond to it, and whether or not you can turn it into a positive situation. Too many in the music industry have taken piracy and turned a bad situation into something worse -- pissing off fans, annoying people, and doing damage to their own brand. Radiohead has long realized it's better to do the exact opposite. That's not cheering on the hacking (or piracy), but noting that when a bad thing happens, you might as well figure out how to make the best of it.

Radiohead has done that. I wish many others in that industry would do the same.

"But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the monopoly itself, in its original operation, may produce more evil than good."

And Thomas Jefferson, who grudgingly ran the patent system for a while (and where he tried to institute rules to prevent abuse) seemed to regret the entire concept of patents:

... generally speaking, other nations have thought that these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society; and it may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are as fruitful as England in new and useful devices.

But one quote regarding such monopolies that sticks most with me is that of UK Parliament member Thomas Macauley, who gave a famous speech in 1841, in which he declared:

Sir, that I may safely take it for granted that the effect of monopoly generally is to make articles scarce, to make them dear, and to make them bad...

He further noted that if there is a case that the only way to remunerate people is through such a monopoly they may grudgingly be granted, but warns of the evil this will enable if allowed to do more than incentivize the original creation:

It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.

I'm thinking about these quotes, yet again, in relation to Qualcomm. Just a month after settling the lawsuit with Apple, a federal judge in an ongoing antitrust lawsuit filed by the FTC, laid out in massive detail just how evil Qualcomm has been in using its monopoly powers to stifle innovation and competition. The 283-page ruling is incredibly damning -- and if you don't feel like reading the whole thing, Tim Lee over at Ars Technica has an only slightly shorter summary of just how Qualcomm's shake down scam worked.

I read every word of Judge Koh's book-length opinion, which portrays Qualcomm as a ruthless monopolist. The legal document outlines a nearly 20-year history of overcharging smartphone makers for cellular chips. Qualcomm structured its contracts with smartphone makers in ways that made it almost impossible for other chipmakers to challenge Qualcomm's dominance. Customers who didn't go along with Qualcomm's one-sided terms were threatened with an abrupt and crippling loss of access to modem chips.

"Qualcomm has monopoly power over certain cell phone chips, and they use that monopoly power to charge people too much money," says Charles Duan, a patent expert at the free-market R Street Institute. "Instead of just charging more for the chips themselves, they required people to buy a patent license and overcharged for the patent license."

Qualcomm -- which it should be noted has been one of the most aggressive agitators against patent reform (and sometimes in favor of making patent law much, much worse) -- is basically the world's largest patent troll, and it loved every minute of it.

Qualcomm's patent licensing fees were calculated based on the value of the entire phone, not just the value of chips that embodied Qualcomm's patented technology. This effectively meant that Qualcomm got a cut of every component of a smartphone—most of which had nothing to do with Qualcomm's cellular patents.

"Qualcomm charges us more than everybody else put together," Apple executive Jeff Williams said. "We've never seen such a significant licensing fee tied to any other IP we license," said Motorola's Todd Madderom.

And, of course, Qualcomm leveraged its position to hold everyone over a barrel:

These high royalties reflected an unusual negotiating tactic called "no license, no chips." No one could buy Qualcomm's cellular chips unless they first signed a license to Qualcomm's patent portfolio. And the terms of these patent deals were heavily tilted in Qualcomm's favor.

Once a phone maker had signed its first deal with Qualcomm, Qualcomm gained even more leverage. Qualcomm had the right to unilaterally terminate a smartphone maker's chip supply once the patent licensing deal expired.

"If we are unable to source the modem, we are unable to ship the handset," said Motorola executive Todd Madderom in a deposition. "It takes many months of engineering work to design a replacement solution, if there is even a viable one on the market that supports the need."

That made Qualcomm's customers extremely vulnerable as they neared the expiration of a patent licensing deal. If a customer tried to negotiate more favorable terms—to say nothing of formally challenging Qualcomm's patent claims in court—Qualcomm could abruptly cut off the company's chip supply.

And, of course, Qualcomm used this power to crush the competition and stamp out any kind of non-Qualcomm innovation.

Qualcomm's first weapon against competitors: patent licensing terms requiring customers to pay a royalty on every phone sold—not just phones that contained Qualcomm's wireless chips. This gave Qualcomm an inherent advantage in competition with other chipmakers. If another chipmaker tried to undercut Qualcomm's chips on price, Qualcomm could easily afford to cut the price of its own chips, knowing that the customer would still be paying Qualcomm a hefty patent licensing fee on every phone.

Also notable: right after Apple and Qualcomm settled their legal dispute in April, Intel announced it was exiting the mobile 5G chip space, and admitted it was entirely because of that settlement:

“In light of the announcement of Apple and Qualcomm, we assessed the prospects for us to make money while delivering this technology for smartphones and concluded at the time that we just didn’t see a path,” [Intel CEO Bob] Swan said.

And the ruling a month later made clear, Qualcomm's patent attack against Apple was very much driven by fear of competition from Intel:

Freed of Qualcomm's chip supply threat, Apple began to challenge Qualcomm's high patent royalty rates. Qualcomm responded by cutting Apple off from access to Qualcomm's chips for new iPhone models, forcing Apple to rely entirely on Intel for the cellular chips in its 2018 models. Qualcomm sued Apple for patent infringement in courts around the world, while Apple pressed the Federal Trade Commission to investigate Qualcomm's business practices.

And, of course, Qualcomm has long used its patents to directly stifle any competition as opposed to the indirect versions described above:

Chipmakers are ordinarily expected to acquire patents related to their chips and indemnify their customers for patent problems. But Qualcomm refused to license its patents to competitors, putting them in a difficult position.

"The prevailing message from all of the customers I engaged with was that they expected us to have a license agreement with Qualcomm before they would consider purchasing 3G chipsets from MediaTek," said Finbarr Moynihan, an executive at chipmaker MediaTek.

If a chipmaker asked to license Qualcomm's patents, Qualcomm would only offer a promise not to sue the chipmaker itself—not the chipmaker's customers.

As Tim Lee highlights, Qualcomm was so comically evil in executing this plan, it literally laid out the details of how to starve MediaTek (MTK) in a PowerPoint presentation:

This is summarized in the judge's opinion:

The slide includes the strategy “make sure MTK can only go after customers with WCDMA SULA,” with an arrow leading to “Reduce # of MTK’s 3G customers to ~50.”... The next strategy is “Formulate and execute a GSM/GPRS strategy to destroy MTK’s 2G margin & profit,” with an arrow to “Take away the $$ that MTK can invest in 3G.” .... Thus, Qualcomm’s refusal to license MediaTek was designed to (and in fact did) limit MediaTek’s customer pool and reduce MediaTek’s revenue base to invest in future cellular generations.

There's a LOT more in the ruling by Judge Lucy Koh and it basically lays out a road map of pure evil by Qualcomm, allowing it to skim a ton of (literal) monopoly rents off the entire mobile phone market, even when its own innovations were a minimal part of that market -- while at the same time abusing its patent position to deliberately stifle competition and innovation. The court order says that Qualcomm needs to renegotiate its licenses, and can no longer use its "no license, no chip" deals that block customers from buying Qualcomm chips if they don't have a license.

Of course, Qualcomm won't go down without a fight, and has announced that it's appealing the ruling. So this will go on for some time. But if you ever want a pure example of the "evil" created by excessive patent monopolies, Qualcomm is about as pure an example as you can find.

As we've discussed before, you'll often hear big pharma insisting it needs patents because it takes some ungodly sum to research and bring a patent to market. That number goes up every year. By a lot. In the early 2000s, the numbers was clocked at $800 million. Last year, drug companies were now claiming $2.7 billion. But much of that is a total myth. Indeed, research shows that big pharma is often adding up the costs that the federal government itself spends on encouraging new drug development and adds it to the total cost as if that cost is borne by the pharmaceutical industry, rather than the taxpayer.

And yet, even though the US taxpayer tends to pay for a significant share of the research and development in new drugs, big pharma companies which take over the project down the road get to keep 100% of the profits -- and, thanks to a totally broken patent system that gives them a literal monopoly, they jack up the prices to insane levels (and this works because of our idiotic healthcare setup in which no one ever knows the cost of what we're buying, and insurance companies act as weird middlemen).

I'm reminded of all this in reading a new piece by Dr. Eugene Gu, talking about the absolute insanity of Truvada, an important drug for HIV patients, which is controlled by pharma company Gilead Sciences. Gu outlines a story that reflects exactly what we discussed above. Gilead charges impossibly high fees for Truvada even though most of the development was paid for by US taxpayers:

While the generic version of Truvada is available in many countries outside the United States for around $840 annually per patient, Gilead uses its patent on the drug to charge Americans close to around $24,000 annually per patient. That’s for the exact fixed dose combination of tenofovir and emtricitabine that costs around $60 annually per patient to produce.

[....]

What's infuriating is that American taxpayers funded much of the research and development for Truvada. So much, in fact, that according to the Yale Global Health Justice Partnership it's the CDC that actually owns the patent for the drug. So Gilead has basically been making $3bn a year selling a drug that actually belongs to Americans themselves.

And, as Gu notes, the situation gets even more ridiculous and more corrupt:

And that’s not all. Gilead recently partnered with Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar and President Donald Trump to roll out a public relations scheme to fool the public. During this, Gilead declared that it would be donating enough Truvada to treat 200,000 patients each year until 2030. While it sounds great on the surface, that basically means it will donate around $12m a year while making billions in profits and getting a tax break.

There are all sorts of reasons why our healthcare system is truly messed up, but the fact that taxpayers pay for the development of critical life saving drugs, but then the government allows big pharma companies to effectively control the patent, extract massive monopoly rents, and then give them tax breaks for donating a tiny percentage... seems particularly fucked up.

Or, as it apparently turns out, the system is a lovely avenue for pure extortion, according to recent reports.

A Youtuber called ObbyRaidz, who makes videos about Minecraft, has found himself having received two copyright "strikes" on Youtube from a blackmailer calling themselves VengefulFlame, who has demanded "$150 PayPal or $75 btc (Bitcoin)" or equivalent "goods/services" to have the strikes removed. If ObbyRaidz doesn't comply, VengefulFlame could send one more complaint to Youtube and have ObbyRaidz's account -- and all the videos he's created -- permanently deleted.

ObbyRaidz says he's been unable to get any help from Youtube, despite repeated complaints and entreaties.

This isn't some one-off instance, either. It turns out that this sort of extortion is a somewhat regular occurrence. And even that shouldn't really matter, because it's plain as can be that a system that even allows for the possibility of this kind of abuse is a system that is too broken to be allowed to continue. If anything, the demonstration of a flaw of this magnitude should result in the immediate reformation of YouTube's policies. It's permanent deletion policies, at the very least, should be top of the list to reform as its users are currently in danger of losing access to the platform that is choosing not to support them.

And we should keep this in mind given what's going on in the EU, where the government there appears to want to roll out this avenue for abuse to everyone, for everything, all the time.

The extortion attempt is a timely reminder of what's at stake in the fight over the EU's Copyright Directive, which mandates a much broader version of ContentID, but for every service and every type of copyrighted work, from tweets to Minecraft skins. Under the proposal, anyone could add anything to the databases of blocked content, and get anyone else's work censored; while this could be used simply to suppress information that a fraudster doesn't like (say, reports of political corruption or complaints about a scammy business), they could also be used as fuel for extortion.

It's going to be a fucking mess, mostly because the over-sized government is seeking to kneel before the content industries by serving them a half-baked plan to create some copyright database that simply is going to be abused, full stop. The lesson of ContentID is in what shouldn't be done, not what should. And certainly not what should be done on the scale of a continent.

The brutal nine-page opinion [PDF] opens with this caustic appraisal of the porn company's business model. (h/t Eric Goldman)

Strike 3 is [...] a copyright troll. Its swarms of lawyers hound people who allegedly watch their content through Bittorrent, an online service enabling anonymous users to share videos despite their copyright protection. Since Bittorrent masks users' identities, Strike 3 can only identify an infringing Internet protocol (IP) address, using geolocation technology to trace that address to a jurisdiction. This method is famously flawed: virtual private networks and onion routing spoof IP addresses (for good and ill); routers and other devices are unsecured; malware cracks passwords and opens backdoors; multiple people (family, roommates, guests, neighbors, etc.) share the same IP address; a geolocation service might randomly assign addresses to some general location if it cannot more specifically identify another. [...]

Simply put, inferring the person who pays the cable bill illegally downloaded a specific file is even less trustworthy than inferring they watched a specific TV Show. But in many cases, the method is enough to force the Internet service provider (ISP) to unmask the IP address's subscriber. And once the ISP outs the subscriber, permitting them to be served as the defendant, any future Google search of their name will turn up associations with the websites Vixen, Blacked, Tushy, and Blacked Raw. The first two are awkward enough, but the latter two cater to even more singular tastes.

The court goes on to point out it isn't copyright law that vindicates the plaintiff but rather "the law of large numbers." Strike 3 has filed 1,849 copyright infringement lawsuits across the nation (according to Judge Lamberth's count), resulting in an untold number of settlements. And that's all this really is: another attempt to force someone, anyone, to cough up some money rather than face off in court. As Judge Lamberth notes, copyright trolls "consume 58%" of the federal court system's copyright lawsuit docket. They're a burden on the courts and a burden on the public. Judge Lamberth calls Strike 3 on its copious bullshit:

These serial litigants drop cases at the first sign of resistance, preying on low-hanging fruit and staying one step ahead of any coordinated defense. They don't seem to care about whether defendant actually did the infringing, or about developing the law. If a Billy Goat Gruff moves to confront a copyright troll in court, the troll cuts and runs back under its bridge. Perhaps the trolls fear a court disrupting their rinse-wash-and-repeat approach: fie a deluge of complaints; ask the court to compel disclosure of the account holders; settle as many claims as possible; abandon the rest.

Rather than be an accomplice in Strike 3's shady game, Judge Lamberth denies its request for discovery. Without further discovery, Strike 3 can't serve anyone with a lawsuit, which will prevent Strike 3 from refiling in this court at least, even with a dismissal without prejudice that leaves that door open.

No copyright troll is going to try to keep a case alive in Lamberth's court, not after this damning summation of their collective efforts:

Armed with hundreds of cut-and-pasted complaints and boilerplate discovery motions, Strike 3 floods this courthouse (and others around the country) with lawsuits smacking of extortion. It treats this Court not as a citadel of justice, but as an ATM.

This will limit Strike 3's litigation in this particular jurisdiction. But that's what venue shopping is for. At least defendants have another opinion to quote when fighting back against trolls like Strike 3.

Worse, the appeals court affirmed the convictions despite a significant Section 230 defense. The opinion contorted Section 230 law, relying on outmoded legal theories from Roommates.com. Fortunately, I haven't seen many citations to the appellate court's misinterpretation of Section 230, so the doctrinal damage to Section 230 hasn't spread too much (yet). However, that still leaves open whether Bollaert's conviction was correct.

Bollaert raised that issue by filing a habeus corpus petition in federal court. Such petitions are commonly filed and almost never granted, so Bollaert's petition had minimal odds of success as a matter of math. Not surprisingly, his petition fails.

The district court says that Section 230's application to Bollaert's circumstance does not meet the rigorous standard of "clearly established federal law":

In this case, the Supreme Court has never recognized that the CDA applies in state criminal actions. The Supreme Court has never indicated circumstances that would qualify a state criminal defendant for CDA immunity. Absence of applicable Supreme Court precedent defeats the contention that Petitioner is entitled to CDA immunity under clearly established federal law...

federal circuits have not applied CDA immunity in state criminal actions or indicated circumstances that would qualify a state criminal defendant for CDA immunity. Petitioner cannot satisfy § 2254(d)(1) with district court opinions applying CDA immunity in state criminal actions.

I've routinely blogged about the application of Section 230 to state criminal prosecutions, and I even wrote a lengthy discourse on why that was a good thing. Still, I can't think of any federal appellate courts that have reached this conclusion, so perhaps the court's factual claim about the jurisprudential absence is correct.

The court adds that even if Section 230 qualified as "clearly established federal law," the appellate court ruling didn't necessarily contravene that law:

the California Court of Appeal performed an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the applicable circuit court decisions before concluding Petitioner is an information content provider under Roommates. The state court reasonably interpreted Roommates and Jones, and reasonably concluded that Petitioner "developed, at least in part, the offensive content on his Web site by requiring users to input private and personal information as a condition of posting the victims' pictures, making him an information content provider within the meaning of the CDA."

This passage reinforces the deficiencies of the appellate court's Section 230 discussion. "[R]equiring users to input private and personal information as a condition of posting the victims' pictures" is not the encouragement of illegal content, as referenced by Roommates.com, as that information isn't actually illegal; and the Jones case rejected an "encouragement" exclusion to Section 230 while ruling for the defense. Do those deficiencies support the extraordinary relief of habeus corpus? Apparently not.

Reposted from Eric Goldman's Technology & Marketing Law Blog

What makes that stated goal somewhat odd is that Njord Law appears to spend almost no time in the courtroom for literally anything else beyond getting this customer data. Despite the firm's own admission that nearly half of the recipients of these letters don't even bother to respond, the firm has brought exactly zero of these cases to the courtroom.

After trawling records held by the Patent and Market Court and all those held by the District Courts dating back five years, SVT did not find a single case of a troll taking a citizen to court and winning a case. Furthermore, no law firm contacted by the publication could show that such a thing had happened.

“In Sweden, we have not yet taken someone to court, but we are planning to file for the right in 2018,” Emelie Svensson, lawyer at Njord Law, told SVT.

Njord Law has made promises of courtroom appearances in the past as well, which have yet to materialize. And that really should tell you everything you need to know about the copyright troll business model. Whatever noises trolls might make about justice and the law, they have no interest in actually engaging the accused in the courtroom. Such litigation is expensive, for starters, compared with simply scaring people into handing over small settlement amounts essentially for free. Also, it would be in the courtroom that any challenge as to the quality of evidence being used to extract these settlements would occur.

The reality is that these trolls want to exist in something of a copyright DMZ, tossing out legal threats while never actually ending up in a courtroom battle. If that sounds like a species of blackmail to you, you aren't alone.

“There is a risk of what is known in English as ‘legal blackmailing’,” says Mårten Schultz, professor of civil law at Stockholm University.

“With [the copyright holders’] legal and economic muscles, small citizens are scared into paying claims that they do not legally have to pay.”

Why the political representatives of the citizens of Sweden would choose not to outlaw these sorts of tactics is an open question. Surely a political party called The Pirate Party cannot be the only group opposed to the legal blackmailing of the Swedish public.

Assuming the arrest warrant is fairly stating things, the site's operators may not have had the best of intentions in running their site the way they did. According to the facts alleged they were more interested in making money by charging people to have their pictures removed from their site than in serving as any sort of public records archive.

But it shouldn't matter why they pursued the editorial policy that they did. First of all, mugshots are generally public records, and for good reason. As South Dakota's attorney general Mark Jackley noted last year, when South Dakota declared them to be public records:

"The release of criminal booking photographs to the public will result in greater transparency in the criminal process, enhance public safety, and will further assist the media and the public in the proper identification of individuals in the criminal process."

People are ordinarily allowed to share public records on their websites, just as they may share any other lawful information. People are also free to be arbitrary and capricious in how they choose what information to share. They are even free to be financially motivated in making those decisions.

But according to authorities in California, if the decision on what information to share is linked to a profit incentive (from the arrest warrant: "The motive behind posting the damaging material is financial gain."), and that information is a mugshot, you go to jail. In the case of the Mugshots.com operators, authorities have predicated their arrest on some alarming statutory language:

As of January 1, 2015, California Civil Code Section 1798.91 .1, Subdivision makes it unlawful for any person engaged in publishing or otherwise disseminating a booking photograph through a print or electronic medium to solicit, require, or accept the payment of a fee or other consideration from a subject individual to remove, correct, modify, or to refrain from publishing or otherwise disseminating that booking photograph. By posting the booking photograph online, and requiring a fee to have it removed, the owners and operators of Mugshots.com and Unpublisharrest.com are operating their websites for an unlawful purpose.

In addition, the authorities construed what the operators of Mugshots.com did as identity theft:

California Penal Code Section 530.5 defines identify theft, stating: "Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information . . . of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose. . . without the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense. Section 530.55 identifies a 'person' as a natural person, firm, company, corporation or any other legal entity. The section defines 'personal identifying information' as any 'name, address . . . or other unique physical representation.' Because Mugshots.com and Unpublisharrest.com have used, and continue to use, the booking photographs and PII of individuals for purposes of selling the service of removing the photographs and information, the owners are in violation of California Penal Code Section 530.5, identity theft, a felony."

Taken together, the arrest warrant concludes, the site operators are guilty of extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. But to prove extortion prosecutors must show that the accused threatened a victim either with violence, the accusation of a crime, or the exposure of a secret, if they didn't pay the accused. Yet the defendants are accused of none of these things. Not only is there no issue of threatened violence, but what the site operators are alleged to have done in no way involves revealing a secret or accusing another of a crime. Instead it is the state that has already accused the site operators' purported "victims" of a crime, and its having done so is no secret. The state's accusation against these people became public when it originally released the mugshots, meaning there is nothing that the site operators could have been threatening to reveal that wasn't already revealed.

This apparently sloppy reading of the extortion statute, compounded with the 2015 statutory language giving mugshots a sort of magical status that prevents them from being treated as an ordinary public record, represents a chilling incursion on protected First Amendment activity. It's one thing to impose liability for publishing content that isn't lawful, perhaps because it's defamatory, infringing, or somehow intrinsically wrongful unto itself. But it's another thing entirely to impose liability for publishing content that is entirely lawful – especially, as in this case, when it is not only lawful but a public record.

California authorities would likely argue that the prosecution is not about liability for speech, but liability arising from the decisions about what speech got spoken. (Or, more particular to this case, remained spoken, for the state is not prosecuting the site operators for having posted the mugshots in the first place.) But this is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, decisions about what we choose to say can be as expressive as anything we actually do say. The government ordinarily does not get to come in and force us to make those decisions in any particular way. Freedom of expression means that we are at liberty to decide what to say, and then what not to say, for whatever reason we might decide. Even when these expressive choices are guided by a profit motive.

Were that not the case, think of how chilling it would be to profit-driven news media if their editorial decisions had to be free from any financial concern in order to retain First Amendment protection. Even in terms of mugshots themselves, think about how chilling it would be if others could not freely use them to tell us about the world around us, if there was money to be made in the process. As case in point, the very same week the arrest warrant was used to extradite the site operators back to California, the New York Times ran a story about the efforts of journalist and photographer Eric Etheridge to document the lives of Freedom Riders.

Among the important artifacts of this historic campaign are more than 300 mug shots taken of the Freedom Riders in Jackson, now the subject of “Breach of Peace: Portraits of the 1961 Mississippi Freedom Riders” (Vanderbilt University Press). In it, the journalist and photographer Eric Etheridge provides visual and oral histories of these courageous men and women, juxtaposing vintage mug shots with short biographies, interviews and contemporary portraits. Originally published in 2008, this expanded edition, with updated profiles and additional portraits…

It is a book that is for sale, so it would seem there is a profit motive somewhere. But consider whether this important historical work could be released if authorities in California – or, perhaps more saliently, in Mississippi, where the mugshots are from – could scrutinize the expressive decisions that went into the book's use of the pictures because it profited from that use.

Yet that's what the California authorities have decided they are entitled to do with the Mugshots.com site. The arrest warrant is dismissive towards the free speech interests of the site's operators, accusing them of "using freedom of speech theories in justifying the activity." Of course, that's what the First Amendment is for, to protect expressive activities that authorities do not like. And authorities really don't like what happened here.

As noted above, the optics in this case are not great. People felt desperate to have their mugshots removed from the Internet, and the site operators profited from that desperation. It feels criminal, but just because they may have had nefarious intent does not mean that they committed a crime. Just reading about the arrest brought to mind the Monty Python sketch where a bunch of gangsters connived a devious plot to go to a jeweler's to obtain an expensive watch - that they paid for.

Sure, it looks like they are up to no good, but to determine whether a crime has been committed we can't just consider how it looks. We have to look closely at the underlying lawfulness of the activity, not the optics surrounding it, and for the very same reason that California authorities are now interested in policing the use of mugshots: to prevent unwarranted inferences of criminal culpability. As the New York Times wrote about the Freedom Riders book:

If these mug shots inadvertently captured the humanity and special qualities of their principled subjects, as Mr. Etheridge observed, their intention was nefarious: to publicly impugn and humiliate people whose only crime was to advocate equality through peaceful protest. No matter their purpose, mug shots inevitably imply aberrance or delinquency, whether or not the people they depict are eventually found to be guilty.

But that's what the California prosecutors have done: impute "aberrance or delinquency" to draw unwarranted inferences about criminal culpability from an act that the law cannot constitutionally criminalize. This inference has already been used to strip the site operators of their constitutional right to express themselves anonymously due to at least three search warrants that were served on their service providers. These warrants were issued upon probable cause, but the only probable cause that can be construed here is that the site operators engaged in expressive activity authorities did not like. Efforts by these authorities to now extradite, further prosecute, and potentially leave the site operators vulnerable to civil damages should not be cheered by anyone who might prefer not to experience the same as a result of their own lawful expression.

The case began back in December 2016 when patent assertion entity Automated Transactions, LLC ("ATL") and inventor David Barcelou filed a complaint [PDF] in New Hampshire Superior Court against 13 defendants, including banking associations, banks, law firms, lawyers, and a publisher. ATL and Barcelou claimed that all of the defendants criticized ATL's litigation in a way that was defamatory. The court summarizes describes the claims as follows:

The statements the plaintiffs allege are defamatory may be separated into two categories. The first consists of instances in which a defendant referred to a plaintiff as a "patent troll." The second is composed of characterizations of the plaintiffs' conduct as a "shakedown," "extortion," or "blackmail."

These statements were made in a variety of contexts. For example, ATL complained that the Credit Union National Association submitted testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary [PDF] that referred to ATL as a "troll" and suggested that its business "might look like extortion." The plaintiffs also complained about an article in Crain's New York Business that referred to Barcelou as a "patent troll." The complaint alleges that the article included a photo of a troll that "paints Mr. Barcelou in a disparaging light, and is defamatory."

ATL had filed over 50 lawsuits against a variety of banks and credit unions claiming that their ATM machines infringed ATL's patents. ATL also sent many demand letters. Some in the banking industry complained that these suits and demands lacked merit. There was some support for this view. For example, in one case, the Federal Circuit ruled the several of ATL's asserted patent claims were invalid and that the defendants did not infringe. The defendants did not infringe because the patents were all directed to ATMs connected to the Internet and it was "undisputed" that the defendants' products "are not connected to the Internet and cannot be accessed over the Internet."

Given the scale of ATL's litigation, it is not surprising that it faced some criticism. Yet, the company responded to that criticism with a defamation suit. Fortunately, the court found the challenged statements to be protected opinion. Justice Brian T. Tucker explained:

[E]ach defendant used "patent troll" to characterize entities, including ATL, which engage in patent litigation tactics it viewed as abusive. And in each instance the defendant disclosed the facts that supported its description and made ATL, in the defendant's mind, a patent troll. As such, to the extent the defendants accused the plaintiffs of being a "patent troll," it was an opinion and not actionable.

The court went on to explain that "patent troll" is a term without a precise meaning that "doesn't enable the reader or hearer to know whether the label is true or false." The court notes that the term could encompass a broad range of activity (which some might see as beneficial, while others see it as harmful).

The court also ruled that challenged statements such as "shakedown" and comparisons to "blackmail" were non-actionable "rhetorical hyperbole." This is consistent with a long line of cases finding such language to be protected. Indeed, this is why John Oliver can call coal magnate Robert Murray a "geriatric Dr. Evil" and tell him to "eat shit." As the ACLU has put it, you can't sue people for being mean to you. Strongly expressed opinions, whether you find them childish or hilariously apt (or both), are part of living in a free society.

Justice Tucker's ruling is a comprehensive victory for the defendants and free speech. ATL and Barcelou believe they are noble actors seeking to vindicate property rights. The defendants believed that ATL's conduct made it an abusive patent troll. The First Amendment allows both opinions to be expressed.

Reposted from EFF's Deeplinks blog

As our own Karl Bode noted in 2014, this theory was backed by the ISPs, who claimed these notices helped curb a majority of piracy. We also noted in that post that the "notice and notice" system appeared to be preferable to our "notice and takedown" system because it appeared to be a less likely avenue for abuse by copyright holders and trolls. Sadly, that was immediately disproven by Rightscorp, with abuse of the system continuing up to the present. When eighty-year-old women are getting settlement shakedown threats from copyright trolls over video games, the aims of educating the public have clearly been subverted.

And it seems some in the mainstream press are finally waking up to it. The CBC published a post detailing that shakedown story along with a few others, before openly wondering whether this system is working as intended.

The so-called "notice-and-notice" system came into effect at the start of 2015. It requires internet service providers to forward copyright infringement notices to customers suspected of downloading unauthorized content such as movies, TV shows and video games. Internet providers must forward the notices because the accusers can't, on their own, determine the identities of the people they're targeting.The notice system was supposed to educate abusers and discourage piracy. But that's not the main message many Canadians are getting.

CBC News asked the federal government what it's doing to address concerns about settlement fee demands. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada explained that the notice regime is up for review in late 2017. Spokesman Hans Palmer said the review will allow it to "take stock and consider whether desired policy objectives are being met."

That's going to be an awfully hard circle for Palmer's agency to square, I think, given how often these stories of threat letters are made public. And you can certainly believe that the actual number of these types of shakedowns that occur is a multiple of those that get reported. Laudable though the goals of this Canadian system may have been, in practice it has clearly become just another opportunity for abuse.

But nothing in Bollaert’s § 530.5 discussion was limited to revenge porn, or to extortion.

Say, for instance, that Kendra Schmollaert, Kevin Bollaert’s second cousin, has a blog with a couple of thousand readers. She publishes a blog post that mentioned an acquaintance’s formerly private sex scandal (or medical problem) and gives the acquaintance’s name. That may well constitute the tort of disclosure of private facts, and maybe Schmollaert should be liable for that. (I think the tort is too broad and vague to be constitutional, but most courts disagree with me on that.) But, to her surprise — and, I suspect, to the surprise of most media lawyers — a prosecutor decides to charge Schmollaert criminally. Guilty!

1. Schmollaert willfully published the aquaintance’s “identifying information” — the full name, and possibly some indication of location (e.g., if Schmollaert says the acquaintance is Schmollaert’s neighbor).
2. Schmollaert did so with the purpose of committing a tort, namely the disclosure of private facts. (True, Schmollaert wasn’t doing this just for the sake of committing a tort, but neither was Bollaert — Schmollaert wanted to tell an interesting story, or maybe expose an acquaintance whom Schmollaert disliked, while Bollaert wanted to make money, and both purposefully used people’s identifying information as a means of accomplishing that goal.)
3. Schmollaert didn’t reveal any nude photographs — but nothing in § 530.5(a) says anything whatever about nudity, or about photographs; as the courts have interpreted the statute, tortious disclosure of private facts is enough.
4. Schmollaert also wasn’t impersonating anyone — but neither was Bollaert.

Or say that Schmollaert instead starts selling T-shirts that depict photographs of celebrities, with captions that give the celebrities’ names. Under California law, that’s a tort, both statutory and common-law, and might lead to liability. But again Schmollaert also turns out to be guilty of a crime:

1. She willfully published the celebrities’ “personal identifying information” (“full names, … as well as the … photographs themselves.”
2. She did so with the purpose of infringing the celebrities’ right of publicity.

I don’t think the California Legislature was trying, with § 530.5, to so broadly criminalize tortious speech. But that’s how California courts have interpreted the statute.

And this also helps show why many commentators — myself included — criticize proposed statutes based on the possible scope of their broad and vague language, rather than just focusing on the particular problem that led to the proposal. Once a statute is enacted, prosecutors will often push them to the limits of the language, especially when the defendants are bad people doing bad things (e.g., Bollaert’s revenge porn blackmail racket). And courts will often (not always, but often) read the language broadly. The story of § 530.5 is a classic example.

In this case, the People seek to chip away at the clear protections provided by the Communications Decency Act. The People claim the statute’s protection did not apply to Yougotposted because Yougotposted administered the website and possessed the authority to pick and choose which information was posted. Here the People’s reliance on speculation and conjecture fails to strip appellant of the statute’s immunity. If the People’s arguments are accepted, the approach would provide an avenue for other litigants to end-run the bright-line protections provided by the statute, jeopardizing service providers and undermining speech in the process. This amounts to bad policy.

By requiring users to post personal identifying information, appellant became an “information content provider” because he was responsible as a developer and provider of the content he required; thus, he was no longer a mere “interactive service provider” or “access software provider”. In any event, because he intended to defraud victims by concealing his true identity as the operator of both websites, the exception appellant relies on would not apply.

Here, similar to the situation in Roommate, appellant willfully obtained individuals’ personal identifying information by soliciting it from submitters, who were required to include the victims’ full name, location (“city, state, country”), age, and a link to the victims’ Facebook profile page in order to submit photographs. As in Roommate, appellant became responsible for the illegal content of the postings because the illegal content (i.e., the non-consensual use of someone’s personal identifying information, including their private photos) was a condition of use. Appellant then used that information to harass and annoy victims because he knew—with absolute certainty—that by posting the information, the victims would be contacted by numerous strangers whom the victims would find threatening. Appellant also used the information for the unlawful purpose of unlawfully obtaining money from them by demanding payment in exchange for removing his posts. This conduct does not magically become lawful because appellant did it online, or because he recruited third parties to help him inflict harm on a mass scale.

Here, the evidence amply demonstrated appellant’s intent to defraud. When victims asked to have the offending photos removed, they were either referred to the website “ChangeMyReputation.com,” or they followed the link to that site.... This extra step was wholly unnecessary. Appellant could have removed the photos by demanding the money directly from the victims as part of the UGotPosted website. But appellant presumably realized that the victims would be less inclined to pay money to the very person responsible for posting their pictures. By creating a separate website, appellant hoped to deceive the victims into believing that they were receiving the legitimate services of a neutral third party who would restore their reputation, and that they were not simply paying blackmail to an extortionist who was the source of their misery.

Here, the People claimed the statute’s protection did not apply to appellant because he administered the “Yougotposted” website and retained the authority to pick and choose which information was posted. This does not make him a content provider. Those actions of appellant are no different than those found by the courts to be protected under the statute.... The People’s argument must fail because accepting their arguments would eviscerate protections provided by the statute, jeopardizing service providers and undermining free speech in the process.

Here, the People produced no evidence in support of their belated claim that appellant possessed personal identification information with the intent to commit fraud. CALCRIM 2401 describes fraud as having deceived another person in order to cause a loss of money or something of value or damage to a legal, financial or property right. The People belatedly raised the claim that payments made through “changemyreputation.com” were obtained by fraud because the victims were not aware that appellant managed both websites. Problems arise with the argument. First, the link to “changemyreputation.com” was visible on “Yougotposted.com.” There was no evidence suggesting appellant was trying to hide the fact that the sites were connected. A number of the victims stated it was “obvious” that the same person was behind both sites. (4RT pp. 305-306.) Additionally, the People’s argument must fail because the victims clearly believe the payment was to have the photos removed, not because they were “deceived”.

The People argued that appellant used the posting of the photographs on the website to illegally obtain money from those whose photos were posted and to have the photos removed from the “Yougotposted” website. The People argued that appellant threatened to injure the victims or “expose their secrets” by publishing the images on the website. As the CDA provides, interactive computer service providers and access software providers are under no legal obligation to remove postings submitted to their website by third parties, even those postings that are negative in nature. Appellant was simply under no obligation to remove the negative content from his website. He merely offered a service to remove the photos and, by offering such a service, he is engaging in standard business practice and not extortion.

In this case the People proceeded on the theory that the third-party postings constituted exposure of a secret affecting the persons portrayed in the photos. The initial reaction is that appellant’s operation of the website and posting information provided solely by third parties simply does not constitute a threat to expose any secret as to the other persons because the alleged secret (photos) was already in the public domain and had been provided by third parties unaccompanied by any demand for payment. In this case there is absolutely no evidence any request was made through either “Yougotposted” or “changemyreputation.com” before the photos had been submitted by the third parties. In this case appellant merely provided a means whereby, for a fee, information already legally posted could be removed.

The court found the plaintiffs had no pre-existing right to a positive review and that Yelp! was in no way obligated to refrain from manipulating reviews or creating negative ones. Yelp! was simply offering a service when it offered to remove negative reviews from its web page and that the offering of that service in exchange for money amounted to a legitimate business practice.

In the present case, appellant, as an interactive computer service provider was under no legal obligation to remove the postings submitted to the website by third parties, even when those postings are negative in nature. As in the above cited cases, Yelp!, Yahoo!, AOL and the dating website in the Carofano case, as well as “TheDirty.com” case, appellant could legally decline to remove any offending content from his website. Offering a fast, efficient removal service through the site “changemyreputation.com” amounted to a legal practice, akin to the practices approved in Yelp!. No crime of extortion occurred. Yelp! offered to remove negative content for money. They were under no obligation to remove those negative reviews and they offered the additional service in exchange for a fee. This is a business practice, not extortion.

This case, however, is not about incidental harms caused by a free market economy run amok. Appellant is a criminal who intentionally harmed thousands of people, not a legitimate businessman. While many people knew the victims’ secrets (only because appellant had exposed them on his website), many others had not yet seen the photos and it was that threat of continued exposure that appellant used to extort money from the victims. Further, because the website contained the victims’ PII, and because appellant’s website required posters to provide that PII, appellant was obligated to remove the content and he was not simply providing a service that he otherwise had a legal right to perform.

This case arose from the collision of “sexting,” extortion, embezzlement, drugs, and most importantly, the administrative forfeiture of illicit funds under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1619.

They told Lough that they would send the messages and photos to her husband, family, employer, and other authorities. Then the threats became violent. The Weeses told Lough that they knew where she lived and what vehicles her children drove. The Weeses threatened to burn Lough’s house down and to harm her husband. As the threats escalated, so too did the amount of money the Weeses demanded. In total, Lough embezzled $837,398.52 from Bethany to pay the Weeses.

Before the Weeses’ extortion scheme was uncovered, the DEA began investigating Jason and Rachaelle Weese in October 2012. The DEA suspected that the Weeses were operating a marijuana “grow house” in their residence in East Liverpool, Ohio. Officers obtained a search warrant for the house and executed the search on March 19, 2013. The officers did not find a grow operation, but did find marijuana distribution paraphernalia. The officers also searched the Weeses’ safe, finding 169 grams of marijuana and $262,020.00 in United States currency (“the Currency”). The officers seized the Currency and determined that it was the proceeds of the Weeses’ drug activities.

To that end, Bethany submitted enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the Currency belonged to Bethany. Lough confessed to giving the embezzled funds to the Weeses. Some of Lough’s payments were in smaller bills while other payments were in larger bills wrapped in WesBanco bands. Jason Weese posted a picture of crisp $50.00 bills on Rachaelle Weese’s Facebook page with a WesBanco band later identified by the issuing bank teller as being issued to Bethany. Jason and Rachaelle Weese admitted that the Currency came from the proceeds of their extortion. Further, the Weeses concealed the true source of the Currency from the DEA in the course of its investigation. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the Currency came from the proceeds of the Weeses’ extortion and Lough’s embezzlement from Bethany. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that Bethany had an interest in the Currency.

Bethany argues that, based on the relatively small amount of marijuana found, it is unlikely that the Weeses had accumulated over $260,000.00 from street-level drug dealing. Further, the DEA looked at Jason’s Facebook page, but did not look at Rachaelle’s, which would have revealed a picture of $50.00 bills with a WesBanco band, later identified as having been issued to Bethany. Instead, Bethany argues, the DEA focused its investigation almost entirely on Jason and unjustifiably assumed that the Currency was the proceeds of the Weeses’ drug dealing.

Viewing the record in Bethany’s best light, this Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that the DEA should have known, based on its investigation, that the Currency was not the proceeds from the Weeses’ drug sales. Further, a reasonable jury could find that a continued investigation into the Currency’s source could have revealed that it belonged to Bethany. Therefore, this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DEA reasonably should have known of Bethany’s interest in the Currency, and this Court denies the government’s motion for summary judgment as to this issue.

The opinion by a three-judge panel of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ends a years-long battle led by the Detroit Free Press. The paper sued the Justice Department in 2013 after the Marshals Service denied a reporter’s request for booking photos of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges.

DOJ attorney Frank admitted at the hearing that the existing delineation mystified him.

"A person innocent before the law has no privacy interest [in a mug shot release], but someone convicted and serving time has a privacy interest," Frank said. "I can't wrap my head around that."

Citing rulings from sister circuits that run counter to the Sixth Circuit's process, Frank explained that "all we are asking is for the court to find the privacy interest in mug shots is greater than non-trivial."

U.S. Circuit Judge David McKeague questioned the application of such a test, which would, in theory, balance an individual's right to privacy against a public interest in obtaining the pictures.

Frank explained that an individual at the Justice Department would review each request for information to determine if there was a public interest in releasing the mug shots.

McKeague pressed the attorney: "The presumption is that [requesters] don't get the pictures, correct?"

Frank agreed, but was quick to point out that in most cases, "there is no public interest."

Fink meanwhile contended that the current system is a perfect application of "checks and balances," and also provides the individual with the "right to be forgotten" after court proceedings have concluded.

In the undated email, Fink cited an Oct. 13 bulletin by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security that ISIS had called for attacks against law enforcement and government workers.

"To release identifying information about law enforcement personnel under such circumstances would not only result in damages against the Village, and everyone involved in such a release, it would likely be considered as having been done with malice, opening the door to punitive damages," wrote Fink.

Last week, more details emerged in another court hearing before the same judge. He was was concerned that the proposed letter from Dallas Buyers Club LLC (DBC) and Voltage Pictures LLC, the film's foreign sales agent -- which DBC is currently suing (pdf), in another twist in the plot -- would not quote a specific figure that those supposedly infringing would be asked to pay, as the Australian Financial Review reported:

Judge Nye Perram said he was concerned DBC was effectively being given a blank cheque, by not stipulating a dollar figure, which could allow the company to ask for a "very high number".

"I need comfort that you aren't going to extort these people," Judge Perram said.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

The much delayed filing of the summons return simultaneously forced the Court to unnecessarily expend judicial resources in the issuance of an Order to Show Cause and hindered the ability of the Court to manage its docket. With respect to the filing of an answer or other matters dependent on the date of service of process, the Court’s ability to actively manage its docket is entirely dependent on counsel filing a summons return within a reasonable amount of time.

The Court does not view Malibu Media’s conduct in this action in isolation. Rather, the Court views it as part of an unmistakable pattern that has emerged in other actions before this Court and in context of observations made by multiple other federal judges in cases involving Malibu Media.

This Court has observed the conduct of Malibu Media and its counsel of record in over 60 cases filed in this District in the past twelve months. This is not the first case in which Malibu Media has filed a summons return well after the date of service. Counsel appears to have made a misrepresentation in seeking an extension of time to complete service in two cases. The Court also issued an order to show cause after counsel publicly filed a defendant’s name in direct violation of two orders unambiguously ordering counsel to file that information under seal.

Malibu Media asserts that it is necessary to invoke the Court’s subpoena power to “propound discovery in advance of a Rule 26(f) conference.” .... However, not a single one of these 60 cases has ever progressed to a Rule 26(f) conference. In fact, most cases are voluntarily dismissed by Malibu Media pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without obtaining a summons, but presumably after Malibu Media has used the third-party subpoena to obtain a settlement. The name of the IP subscriber is never provided to the Court in these voluntarily dismissed cases. This makes it impossible for this Court or any other court to determine, for example, if a later action should be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(B). In the few cases in which a defendant has appeared with counsel, counsel have raised numerous allegations of impropriety and abusive litigation tactics. The Court is not blind to the reality that these allegations likely substantially underrepresent the amount of misconduct that goes unreported by defendants who simply pay Malibu Media’s settlement demand rather than face the prospect of expensive and extensive litigation regarding their purported interest in pornography.

The Court is aware that Malibu Media, through separate local counsel, has filed thousands of similar cases in federal courts across the country. A copyright troll has been defined as “an owner of a valid copyright who brings an infringement action not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.” .... Under this definition, Malibu Media certainly qualifies. However, Malibu Media generally responds to this allegation by pointing to comments of the trial judge in the so-called bellwether trial as unassailable proof that its intentions and tactics differ from other entities that bring copyright infringement actions related to pornographic movies.

Notwithstanding Malibu Media’s contention that it “instructed counsel nationwide to never file Exhibit C with a complaint again,” ... this Court has borne witness to the fact that Malibu Media has simply evolved this practice rather than eradicate it. In an Order issued in a separate case on October 6, 2014, this Court sua sponte noted a continued vestige of Exhibit C in several paragraphs of Malibu Media’s complaint.... Instead of attaching Exhibit C, Malibu Media adapted its practice and now made an explicit reference to a document with “additional evidence” that the defendant had distributed a large number of third-party files through BitTorrent.... Malibu Media disingenuously offered to produce this document to the Court with the seemingly off-handed remark that “many of the titles to the third party works may also be relevant to proving Defendant is the infringer because they correlate to the Defendant’s hobbies, profession, or other interests.” ... Citing the two Wisconsin district court cases that imposed sanctions for attaching Exhibit C, the Court struck the offending paragraphs from the complaint and ordered Malibu Media to file a conforming amended complaint forthwith.... Two months later, Malibu Media voluntarily dismissed the action without filing an amended complaint.

Here, and in the dozens of other actions before the Court, there is ample evidence that Malibu Media or its “outside general counsel,” rather than its local counsel of record selects the litigation strategy and tactics. 12 Accordingly, the general principle that “directly sanctioning the delinquent lawyer rather than an innocent client” may not apply here....

Here, the record indicates that on February 10, 2015, Malibu Media’s counsel represented that service had not yet occurred. (Doc. 10 at 2). However, it is clear that Defendant was served on January 26, 2015. (Doc. 12). Counsel made no attempt to correct this statement until after the Court issued an Order to Show Cause regarding the apparent failure to complete service of process.