Working under the assumption that the mere existence of cash is illegal, the DEA and TSA lifted the cash from Rebecca Brown, claiming it was "suspicious." A lawsuit followed in January 2020. Shortly after the filing of the lawsuit, the DEA agreed to return the $82,000 it stole from the retiree and his daughter.

The lawsuit, however, continues. The Institute for Justice is representing multiple plaintiffs who've had their cash taken by the TSA and DEA. This return of funds helps Rebecca and her father, but it doesn't stop the DEA and TSA from continuing to declare nearly any amount of cash "suspicious" before taking it from travelers.

Earlier this year, the magistrate judge [PDF] taking the first crack at the case recommended the agencies not be allowed to exit the lawsuit. The government argued the plaintiffs had no standing because traveling with cash is a personal choice -- one that can be made at any time to give rise to claims of possible future injury. Yes, it's a stupid argument. And here it is:

The Government Defendants do not dispute that injuries attendant on seizure of one’s person, effects or cash would be concrete and particularized, or that the prospect of such injuries would be redressible by injunctive relief. Instead, the Government Defendants argue that no injury to Plaintiffs is imminent or likely because Plaintiffs do not allege plans to travel with large sums of cash; and that Plaintiffs cannot “manufacture” standing by “choosing” to refrain from traveling with a large amount of cash.

But "choosing to refrain" would be the wise choice, given the government's predilection for taking cash from travelers without even bothering to conjure up credible probable cause. The court points out where the government's arguments go wrong, starting with the apparent pattern and practice of stealing cash from people passing through airports.

If we accept the premise (as we must at the pleading stage) that TSA and DEA have adopted policies or practices of seizing large sums of cash discovered in TSA screenings, then it is a reasonable inference that if Plaintiffs were to resume domestic air travel with large sums of cash, there would be an imminent, substantial risk that their persons, effects and cash would be subjected to seizure by the TSA and the DEA.

And that's not the government's dumbest argument. Here's the magistrate judge's appraisal of that one -- an appraisal that was presumably prefaced with a facepalm:

Finally, the Government Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ choices to refrain from traveling with large sums of cash cannot be attributable to the TSA’s and DEA’s Seizure Policies, because the Plaintiffs were undeterred by those policies before they became aware of them. This is clearly a non-sequitur. It is hardly surprising that one would take steps to guard against a risk after, rather than before, becoming aware of it.

Love it. The government is basically arguing it should not be deterred from taking cash from passengers no matter what actions travelers take. Travel without cash? Well, you're just manufacturing injury. Travel with cash? Well, you're aware we might take it so you can't get all litigious when we do.

The government also -- unbelievably -- argued its own policies are unconstitutional. But, it claimed, the plaintiffs failed to prove these obviously unconstitutional policies exist.

The Government Defendants do not dispute that the Seizure Policies, if established, would be ultra vires and unconstitutional. However, they assert that the FAC does not plausibly plead the existence of such policies or practices under the standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Government Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ allegations as “merely a conclusion – effectively, a recitation of the elements of Plaintiffs’ claim”; “at best, an ‘amorphous description’” of “actions by individual TSA screeners in particular cases” involving a “handful of individual travelers.”

Possibly, says the magistrate. But the plaintiffs have brought far more than conclusory arguments. From what's alleged, the TSA detains people who have "large amounts" of cash and the DEA is always on hand to swoop in and take it.

First, Plaintiffs relate dozens of incidents of travelers being detained by the TSA after completion of security screening, and/or then being detained by the DEA, for the purpose of seizing the travelers’ currency. That is more than a “handful”.

Second, Plaintiffs identify TSA Operations and Management Directives, Operating Procedures and other TSA documents that direct TSA Screeners who encounter travelers with cash in excess of $10,000 to investigate (“[c]onduct the procedures for checking travel documents”), to notify law enforcement, and to ask the travelers to “remain accessible”.

Third, Plaintiffs allege that in April, 2009 TSA stated on its website that passengers’ required cooperation with the TSA screening process includes “answering questions about . . . why they are carrying a large sum of cash”; that it was “standard practice for TSA Screeners to ‘ask a passenger who is carrying a large sum of cash to account for the money’”; and that such investigations for the purpose of “detecting ‘signs of criminal activity’” were among the “principal duties of TSA Screeners”.

Get all of that? Great, there's more. The plaintiffs are basically bouncing the DEA/TSA's lifeless head off the concrete at this point:

Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that the DEA runs a national interdiction program called “Operation Jetway” which seizes tens of millions of dollars per year from travelers at every major commercial airport, and which provides standardized training and data collection and analysis.

Fifth, the Plaintiffs allege that a 2017 Department of Justice Inspector General’s Report found that most DEA seizures reviewed were unrelated to investigations, posing a risk that DEA “is more interested in seizing and forfeiting cash than advancing an investigation or prosecution.”

And sixth, Plaintiffs allege that DEA interdiction agents have testified that they were trained by the DEA to regard travelers’ cash in excess of $5,000 as presumptively subject to seizure. Again, considering the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is reasonably inferable that the DEA adopted policies and practices governing seizure of cash at airports, and that the DEA agents’ persistent practice of detaining travelers and seizing their cash based solely on its amount is consistent with and revelatory of the agency’s policy.

And so, given all the plausible allegations against the government, the magistrate recommended the TSA and DEA not be allowed to exit the lawsuit via their motion to dismiss. But -- as can be inferred from the title of the document -- it's only a "report" and (most importantly) "recommendation."

The good news is the federal judge handling the case has adopted the magistrate's R&R. As the Institute for Justice reports, the government will still have to deal with this putative class action lawsuit -- one that targets the DEA's well-known love of taking cash from people, as well as the TSA's aiding and abetting of this so-called legal theft.

U.S. District Court Judge Marilyn Horan yesterday rejected the government’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ three class action claims. Those claims are 1) that the TSA exceeds its statutory authority by detaining travelers and their cash after the security screening has ended; 2) that the TSA violates the Fourth Amendment by detaining travelers and their cash without reasonable suspicion of criminality; and 3) that the DEA violates the Fourth Amendment by detaining travelers without reasonable suspicion and seizing their cash without probable cause.

More lawsuits for all involved! That's great news. If nothing else, it may force the DEA to reckon with its unjustified greed and the TSA to reckon with one aspect of its overall awfulness. And if everything goes right, it may provide another clip of judicial ammo to attack civil asset forfeiture.

We're in the middle of a war against drugs. Collateral damage should be expected. That's the viewpoint of drug warriors, even when the "acceptable" collateral damage means nothing more than law enforcement officers taking stuff just because they can.

Here's a rare successful motion for a return of property -- one filed against the Bay County (FL) Sheriff's Office by a person who had his stuff taken even though it was his father being charged with criminal acts. The son -- whose father had all charges dropped after passing away -- took on the Office and secured a ruling that should finally give him back what was taken from him. (via FourthAmendment.com)

Unfortunately, there are still some hurdles standing between the plaintiff and the 75-inch TV and PlayStation 4 taken by the Sheriff's Office during a raid of his father's house. One set of hurdles has already been cleared. But it involved getting the Office to not only admit it was lying about taking the property, but also admitting it had likely liquidated the seized items before it had legal permission to do so.

Here's how the Florida Court of Appeals details the events [PDF] leading up to its findings in favor of the plaintiff.

The Sheriff’s Office initially denied having taken these items, but ultimately admitted that it had. By the time of the hearing below, the Sheriff no longer had the items and did not know where they were.

So, that's the first part of the puzzle. The Office lied to the plaintiff, if not the court itself. And it had apparently gotten rid of the seized property prior to giving the deceased's son a chance to ask for its return. Despite this, the Sheriff's Office argued it lawfully possessed the property it could no longer locate because the "title" to the seized property would have automatically transferred to the Sheriff's Office sixty days after the "conclusion of a legal proceeding." The death of the accused started the sixty-day clock, according to the Sheriff.

Wrong, says the court. That 60-day transfer only goes into effect if the contested items were seized "pursuant to a lawful investigation." That's a pretty low bar but the Sheriff's Office failed to meet it.

At the hearing below, the Sheriff did not address, and therefore did not prove, whether Appellant’s TV and PlayStation were lawfully seized from his bedroom during a search related to his late father’s drug charges.

And that's where the lower court went wrong. It never bothered to make the Sheriff's Office establish the items -- seized from the plaintiff's bedroom -- were linked to the charges facing his father. Back it goes to the lower court where the Sheriff's Office will have to offer some evidence linking the property it can no longer locate to the charges no longer pending against the plaintiff's dead father. Good luck with that. Just because items are inside a house belonging to someone who sells drugs doesn't mean every item in the house was purchased with ill-gotten gains.

If no tenuous link was asserted then, there's no link to a lawful seizure, which means the clock on automatic transfer to the cop shop inventory isn't 60 days, but four years. The items are likely long gone. But the Sheriff's Office may soon find itself shelling out its own ill-gotten gains to replace the ones it apparently unlawfully took from the plaintiff during its drug warring.

This Court finds that South Carolina's forfeiture statutes violate both the federal and South Carolina constitutional protections against excessive fines by permitting the government to seize unlimited amounts of cash and other property without regard to the proportionality of the crime that may have been committed. Indeed, they allow the government to seize unlimited amounts of cash and other property when no crime has been committed, without a criminal conviction and without proof of a crime having been committed beyond a determination of probable cause.

The programs in South Carolina lend themselves to abuse by allowing state law enforcement and prosecutors to claim 95% of anything seized. Law enforcement agencies see the largest portion: 75 percent. Another 20 percent goes to prosecutors. The state itself takes the other five percent.

This is why the state's drug warriors do very little to stop the flow of drugs into the state. Officers patrol the outbound lanes of interstates, hoping to grab cash from dealers after they've offloaded their goods in the state. And, with 95% of the seizure in play, it makes more sense to let the person leave than go through the trouble of pursuing a conviction.

Once the process starts, it barely moves forward at all. There is no time limit on forfeiture proceedings. The law only says proceedings must be started in a "reasonable amount of time." In some cases, prosecutors have waited more than two years to initiate forfeitures. During that time, the person whose property has been taken has no way to contest the seizure, much less attempt to reclaim their stuff.

The state government -- at least the agencies that directly profit from it -- don't want to see these programs ended. The state's Supreme Court has been asked to make a final declaration on the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in South Carolina. While the question is still open, all forfeiture cases in the circuit where it was ruled unconstitutional have been put on hold.

The government wants these moving again. But its arguments -- and its legal rep's apparent inability to provide straightforward answers to the court -- seem to be pushing the state Supreme Court towards siding with the circuit court.

State Supreme Court justices pressed an attorney defending South Carolina’s civil asset forfeiture law with dozens of questions on Wednesday about the practice’s legitimacy, the timing of cases being resolved, and whether the state’s system of seizure and forfeiture leads to frequent abuses by police.

The state's legal rep, James Battle, appeared to be evasive when questioned directly about the programs' potential for abuse, leading to his being shut down by an SC justice before he could start talking his way around the question.

“Wouldn’t you agree that the application of our forfeiture statute, I’m talking generally about application of the statute, has resulted in abuses, disproportionate forfeitures and is a legitimate cause for concern?” Justice John W. Kittredge said.

Battle started to answer, and Kittredge said, “I don’t want you to answer the question by filibuster, and I think you just answered because you’re not willing to acknowledge that the application of our forfeiture statutes in South Carolina have resulted in abuses.”

Battle finally acknowledged the system could be abused, but refused to acknowledge it had been abused.

Battle also claimed the courts could prevent abuse, even if the initial seizure was abusive. While it's true courts are a check against abuse, very few forfeiture cases are actually handled by judges as the small amounts of cash most frequently taken aren't worth the expense of challenging in court.

Justice Kaye Hearn asked Battle if law enforcement having a financial stake affects how they operate. Battle said it can, but a judge must approve the forfeiture.

“So I guess your answer is, even though it may have been improper on the front end, at the tail end of this process it gets fixed by the court?” Hearn said.

“Exactly,” Battle replied.

Another justice pointed out Battle's evasiveness, even as he evaded another direct question about the number of times cases are dropped in exchange for seized property. Battle's response was to claim he only worked with civil cases so he had no idea if this happened or how often. This prompted Chief Justice Donald Beatty to flat out state he "didn't believe" Battle's claim of ignorance.

This isn't over. And oral arguments can sometimes be misleading. But a system that has been repeatedly abused -- and provides all the incentives needed to encourage perpetual abuse -- looks to be on the ropes in South Carolina. The programs are so problematic the government's lawyer can't answer questions directly or honestly without confirming the suspicions of the state justices. That doesn't bode well for the future of forfeiture in the state.

I don't know what criminal organizations are being dismantled at less than $1,000/seizure, but that's the reality of asset forfeiture. A large majority of forfeitures involve amounts too small to be disputed in court, where legal fees quickly outpace any expected recovery.

That's how the system "works." Cops grab what they can and hope the system tilted in their favor pays off. Any incidental effects on crime rates are a bonus. But lowering crime isn't the focus, no matter what's asserted by defenders of legalized theft.

And the facts say otherwise. A study released last year showed asset forfeiture has zero effect on crime rates or drug sales. All it does is take cash from people who need it the most, as is borne out by low dollar amounts most frequently seen in forfeiture cases.

Now, another study is confirming the obvious: asset forfeiture enriches police departments… but not the lives of the people they serve. The study had a great data set to work with. Back in 2015, New Mexico outlawed civil asset forfeiture. If cops wanted to take stuff, they had to secure a conviction. If asset forfeiture was the valuable crime-fighting tool New Mexico law enforcement agencies claimed it was, crime rates would be expected to increase. But that's not what happened, according to the Institute of Justice's study.

[F]ive years after New Mexico effectively banned civil forfeiture, those fears remain unrealized, according to a new study set to be published on Tuesday by the Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm that has been advocating reforms to forfeiture laws. The predicted rise in crime and drop in arrests has not materialized, according to the study, which is based on analyses of FBI data. Arrest and offense rates in New Mexico, the study found, remained essentially flat before and after the 2015 law went into effect. That’s based on an examination of crime overall, as well as a specific set of offenses: drug possession, drug sales, and driving under the influence. Arrest and offense rates were also consistent with trends in two neighboring states, Colorado and Texas.

Despite there being no link between forfeiture and crime reduction, the DOJ continues to claim the system works. The DOJ likes to point to its biggest seizures -- like forfeitures related to high-profile criminal cases involving millions of dollars -- as proof the program is essential to the recovery of criminal proceeds to make whole victims of crimes. But the DOJ purposefully conflates criminal and civil asset forfeiture. The former is tied to criminal convictions. The latter occurs without almost zero court examination or adversarial hearings.

Civil asset forfeiture rarely involves millions of dollars. When court costs are far more than what can be recovered, the system allows cops to amass large sums of cash in small increments. That's the reality of forfeiture: tiny amounts of cash no one outside of law enforcement would assume were the result of criminal activity.

The median forfeiture averaged $1,276 across the 21 states where usable data was obtainable. In most of those states, half of cash seizures fell below $1,000. In Michigan, for example, half of all civil forfeitures of currency were worth less than $423, and in Pennsylvania, that median value was $369.

That's how we're crippling massive criminal conspiracies: with cash amounts that wouldn't even cover a car payment. The median amount in these cases show cops are just shaking down people for the money in their wallets and cooking up a post-seizure justification for taking their money. If it costs $1,000 to fight a $400 seizure, almost everyone is just going to let it go. Then the cops point to the number of unchallenged seizures as "evidence" the alleged perps (who were never arrested or charged) are guilty of criminal activity.

This money is then converted into slush funds for cops -- ones that often aren't subject to additional oversight. Cops pay salaries and make off-the-book purchases of surveillance tech with these funds, secure in the knowledge that their oversight can't oversee line items that aren't reflected in local budget books. The more often they get away with this, the more often they feel they can use their power to take cash from people to buy themselves the things they want.

Meanwhile, no one gets any more safety or security out of the deal. Citizens are subjected to shakedowns by officers without any corresponding decrease in crime rates or increase in public safety. Not only do cops become a law unto themselves with forfeiture programs, they shortchange honest citizens whose tax dollars are being wasted on programs designed to pad cop shop budgets.

Pennsylvania has some of the worst asset forfeiture laws in the nation. And it shows. Law enforcement has occasionally been benchslapped by judges for traveling past the wide boundaries granted to it by local legislators. In one case, a judge stopped the state from seizing a grandmother's house just because her son sold officers $140-worth of marijuana from the residence.

In another case, a judge excoriated officers for stripping a house of everything with possible resale value under the pretense that anything of value in it must have been purchased with drug money.

The Drug Task Force does not seize furniture or clothing, silverware, or other items that have low resale value. They focus upon items that have high resale value. That is not a problem in itself, until the police begin to ignore that there must be a nexus to drug dealing or drug money to seize those higher high value assets. [...] In this case the Drug Task Force personnel ignored the need for such a nexus and engaged in a shopping spree, for the benefit of their budget, based solely on the property's resale value.

The problems continue in Pennsylvania. Courts stop what they can when they see obvious abuse, but they never see most forfeiture cases because seizures require money and legal talent to challenge, which are things most forfeiture victims don't have on hand.

Without a lawyer, people stand little chance. Of the 32 cases The Appeal and Spotlight PA reviewed, the state returned cash or property only when a lawyer got involved, according to case records from the Office of the Attorney General. Out of the $608,000 seized and subsequently prosecuted, the attorney general’s office gave back less than $60,000 after negotiating with property owners' lawyers.

In more than 75% of the cases reviewed, no challenge was raised or the challenge was raised improperly. Both led to the same outcome: the state taking possession of the seized assets.

In some cases, Pennsylvania law enforcement has deemed seized cash to be "guilty" simply because it's been in circulation. The article cites two studies detailing how much drug residue ends up on cash, which has the possibility of turning innocent people into suspects Pennsylvania cops have no interest in charging criminally. A 2008 study showed 42% of currency had trace amounts of meth on it. A 2009 study said nearly 90% of currency is contaminated with cocaine residue. If Pennsylvania cops can't find another pretext to seize cash, they'll test the cash itself for drug residue and go from there.

Out of 11 cases reviewed by The Appeal and Spotlight PA in which no charges were filed, the attorney general’s office justified seizing people’s money after testing the cash for drug residue in 10 of them.

Much of what law enforcement seizes comes from traffic stops. But these stops were so pretextual and bereft of probable cause, roughly a third of all criminal cases arising from traffic stops by drug interdiction officers were thrown out. That hasn't stopped cops from stopping people and trying to talk them out of their cash. They've just become a little more careful and a little less likely to copy-paste non-specific boilerplate like "criminal activity was observed."

But the main point of forfeiture in Pennsylvania is to enrich the agencies participating in it. For all the talk about cracking down on the dangerous drug trade, very few serious criminal charges are tied to forfeitures.

In about one-third of the cases reviewed, police seized cash from people who were never charged with a crime or even issued a traffic ticket. One-quarter of the cases resulted in misdemeanor convictions, and another quarter resulted in felony convictions.

This is how the system works. It has been streamlined for maximum law enforcement efficiency. It serves only the agencies that directly benefit from it. And unless legislators are willing to take on powerful law enforcement interests, it is never going to change.

This is why they fight reporting requirements. No one knows you're just making poor people poorer unless you're required to report all of your forfeitures. Up in Minnesota -- like far too many other places around the country -- law enforcement officers roll Sheriff of Nottingham style. Unfortunately, there's no Robin Hood lurking in the forests patrolled by opportunistic officers.

Here's state auditor Julie Blaha offering her opinion about forfeitures in Minnesota after digging into the data the agencies provided:

“The data shows that when it comes to the impact of forfeitures, the big story is in the small numbers,” Blaha said in a statement. “Those kinds of amounts have a small impact on government systems, but they have a big impact at the individual level.”

[...]

“If you are managing a public safety budget, small forfeitures are a minor and unpredictable part of your revenue stream,” Blaha continued. “But if you are a low income person experiencing a forfeiture, those amounts can have a big effect on your life. Having a few hundred dollars seized can mean the difference between making rent or homelessness. Losing that old car can lead to missing work and losing your job.”

The program punishes the poor. Very few law enforcement agencies which rely on forfeiture for their discretionary funds want to tangle with an actually organized criminal organization. Those guys can afford lawyers. Most citizens can't. That's why most seizures are so small they're not worth fighting in court. At the end of the jurisprudence day, citizens may win back their cash or cars, but they'll lose the war, having paid more in court and legal fees than what their property is worth.

Everything adds up to real money if you have enough of it. Here's the ugly truth, straight from the auditor's report [PDF].

523 (12 percent) forfeitures were less than $100.
1,414 (32 percent) forfeitures ranged from $100 to $499.
858 (20 percent) forfeitures ranged from $500 to $999.
1,252 (29 percent) forfeitures ranged from $1,000 to $4,999.
304 (7 percent) forfeitures were equal to or greater than $5,000.

Only seven percent targeted amounts that might actually do damage to criminal organizations. 64% of forfeitures targeted less than $1,000.

Here's the list of crimes associated with these seizures, which shows officers are willing to take easy wins and easy cash, rather than actually tangle with criminal enterprises far more harmful and dangerous.

In 2019, DUI-related and controlled substance accounted for 94 percent of the forfeitures. DUI-related forfeitures accounted for 3,654, or 47 percent, of reported forfeitures, while forfeitures involving a controlled substance accounted for 3,611, or 47 percent, of reported forfeitures. The remaining forfeitures involved fleeing (251), prostitution (69), “other” crimes (36), weapons (31), robbery/theft (23), assault (20), and burglary (13). Figure 5 on the following page shows completed forfeitures by type of crime.

Oh thank god. They're dismantling Big Drunk. We won't have to fear the scourge of alcohol/drug consumers for much longer. #Heroes. And if that wasn't enough, the dangerous Sinola Fleeing Cartel is being destroyed bit-by-bit. Abandoned property is so much easier to seize and forfeit than stuff people are still standing next to and stating their claim for.

This is how asset forfeiture works: easy wins predicated on criminal activity that rarely affects anyone besides the person stopped and their property. It all adds up though. For the state of Minnesota, the total was $7.5 million. And what did it accomplish? Did it cripple the non-organized crime of driving under the influence? Did it make it less likely for people to carry their personal stashes of illicit substances? No one dismantled a drug cartel. No one ensured Minnesotans would be subjected to fewer violent crimes. All that happened was cops took stuff that was easy to take and spent the money once it rolled in.

That's just one of several disturbing findings in the Institute for Justice's (IJ) new report [PDF] on the DHS's ability to separate travelers from their money. Utilizing the Treasury Department's forfeiture database, the IJ discovered the DHS is a fan of taking cash and does so more frequently at certain airports. The most popular airport for cash seizures is, by far, Chicago's O'Hare. In 2014, the airport accounted for 34% of all cash seized despite handling only 6% of all air travelers.

More travelers means more opportunities, which explains some of the increase in seizures over the past decade. But as the IJ points out, seizures are outpacing the bump in travel stats.

Between 2000 and 2016, the number of air travelers increased 46%, while the inflation-adjusted value of currency seized at airports by DHS agencies increased 140% and the number of airport currency seizure cases grew 178%.

Any international airport will be patrolled by CBP and ICE agents looking for cash to seize. And they're not looking to catch drug dealers, human traffickers, or any other criminals that might be carrying cash around. No, the most common criminal activity to result in forfeitures is nothing more than a reporting violation.

Federal law requires travelers to declare any currency over $10,000 when traveling into or out of the country. It's pretty easy to get this done when traveling into the US, as arriving visitors will be required to go through Customs and declare anything they're bringing into the country, including cash. Outbound travelers may not realize this applies to them and since they're not required to pass through Customs on the way out, they may have no idea they're violating the law. That's an opportunity DHS agencies are more than happy to capitalize on. Half of all seizures between 2000-2016 were for violating this reporting requirement.

In fact, serious criminal activity is something no one seizing money seems very concerned about. Asset forfeiture isn't about dismantling criminal empires. It's about taking cash from people who have limited means to fight back. If the government has all your cash, it's pretty tough to hire a lawyer and fight an uphill battle against a system that dispenses with the property's former owner completely to engage in litigation against the cash itself.

Overall, 69% of DHS agency airport currency seizure cases were not accompanied by an arrest, regardless of the alleged offense. This means less than a third of the time was an offense egregious enough, or the evidence strong enough, to warrant an arrest.

This isn't just a DHS thing. It's an everybody thing.

In 2017, the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an in-depth study of a sample of 100 Drug Enforcement Administration forfeiture cases. The study found that only 44 of those cases advanced or were even related to a criminal investigation. That same year, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reviewed a sample of 278 cases in which currency was seized under “structuring” laws, which prohibit conducting bank transactions below $10,000 to evade federal reporting requirements. The law is in place to prevent crimes like money laundering, but the study found that in 91% of cases, the seized funds were from a legal source, such as a family-owned business. The study also found that IRS agents were encouraged to conduct “quick hits,” where property was easier to seize, “rather than pursue cases with other criminal activity (such as drug trafficking or money laundering), which are more time-consuming.”

Taking money from people has always been easier than fighting crime. That much has been obvious for years. The IRS said the quiet part loud on accident. This report says everything the government isn't willing to admit to the public, much less itself: the point of forfeiture programs is to enrich those performing the forfeitures. That's it. That's the entire thing. Any reductions in criminal activity are purely coincidental.

The DEA stole another person's life savings back in 2015. A raid of house predicated on the theory Miladis Salgado's husband was involved in drug dealing ended with the DEA walking off with $15,000 Salgado had saved for her daughter's quinceanera. This was money Salgado had saved while working at a duty-free shop in the Miami airport, along with gifts from friends and relatives.

And it all was gone after the DEA raided her house. The good news is Salgado eventually got her money back. But it took time and it took a lawyer. In the end, the DEA admitted it had no evidence tying her husband to drug trafficking.

It would take two years for Salgado to recover her money from the DEA, which did not arrest her husband because agents discovered he had not been selling drugs after all. The lead DEA agent admitted in a court deposition that there was no evidence supporting the allegation.

If you sue (which means being able to pay a lawyer), sometimes (and only sometimes) you can get your money back. But that's not the end of the story. The DEA handed the money back to Salgado before a judge could rule on the merits of the case. The agency did this to ensure it didn't have to compensate Salgado for fighting to get her money back.

Before a critical ruling in the civil forfeiture dispute with Salgado, Justice Department lawyers on their own decided to return her money. But at the same time, they argued that Salgado had not really won because a judge granted the feds the right to refile their civil case in the future — even though they probably had no intention of doing so. As a result, the government argued it did not have to pay her attorney’s fees, which she said amounted to $5,000.

Unfortunately, the judge agreed with the government's arguments. It was clear the government had no intention of trying again at the state level. It had only given the money back to avoid a ruling against it that would have made it liable under CAFRA for her legal fees. The court somehow came to the conclusion that the last-minute release (after more than two years of litigation) of the seized money wasn't a bad faith maneuver by the DEA to dodge paying more than it had taken in.

Salgado's case is now in front of the Supreme Court, which is expected to rule on her appeal in April. Hopefully, the court will align itself with citizens who've had money taken from them under the pretense that it's been illegally obtained -- all without a single criminal charge being brought against them. A North Carolina federal court wouldn't let the IRS duck fees in a forfeiture case where the government dropped the case after the victim fought back. Neither should the Supreme Court. Allowing government agencies to use the costs of litigation to deter people from recovering property the government admits (via dismissal, etc.) did not come from illegal sources makes it that much easier for the government to stay in the legalized theft business.

Here's the first part of the MSP's "Yes, we steal money" announcement:

If you can't see the tweet, it says:

Trooper from First District Headquarters conducted a traffic stop for following too close on I-75 in Monroe County on March 3rd. Further investigation resulted in locating and seizing approximately $40,000.00 in cash. The driver was a 33 year old male from out of state and was

Here's the kicker, picking up where the first tweet left off:

not arrested. The investigation continues.

So, some alleged criminal, originally only suspected of "following too close" was pulled over, hassled into a search, and relieved of his $40,000 by state troopers. No arrest, but I guess the money was guilty of something.

This statement, issued a day after the tweets, doesn't really clarify anything. What it does show is the MSP enaged in catch-and-release drug enforcement, where suspected criminals are free to go, but not any cash they happen to have on them.

Lt. Brian Oleksyk, MSP public information officer, said the traffic stop and seizure were related to a narcotics investigation.

“We develop probable cause in order to seize money,” he said.

That's a blanket statement about ideals. That's not a statement specific to this "investigation," which began with a pretextual stop and ended in a windfall for the State Police.

But the most instructive thing about this whole experience is the hundreds of replies calling the State Police thieves. It shows people are pretty sick of hearing cops brag about how they took money from people without actually arresting the supposed criminals who were carrying the cash. Agencies engaged in civil asset forfeiture do not have broad support from the public. If they actually believe they do, they're lying to themselves.

Cash is still a legal way to pay all debts public and private. It says so right on the money. Traveling with cash does not make someone a criminal and the existence of cash isn't the same thing as actual probable cause. I doubt being ratioed on Twitter will make the MSP rethink its forfeiture programs. But it does make it clear many people see "forfeiture" and "theft" as synonymous.

Then there's the question of whether the MSP can actually do this. Last year, a law was passed effectively banning forfeitures under $50,000 without a conviction.

Starting in 90 days, the laws will prohibit assets taken in suspected drug crimes from being forfeited unless the defendant is convicted or the value of the money and property is more than $50,000, excluding the value of contraband.

Prosecutors and cops made highly-questionable arguments against the new law, claiming having to prosecute drug dealers would result in fewer drug dealers being prosecuted. Unless there's a loophole the MSP is planning to use (like the federal option), this set of tweets was the State Police announcing to everyone the agency was planning to break the law. Not a good look.

The state's law enforcement agencies took this ruling and ran with it. To ensure minimum legal hassle, cops are "fighting" crime by taking small amounts of cash and 20-year-old vehicles from people they imagine might have committed a crime, were thinking about committing a crime, or happened to wander into an area where crime exists.

The city of Detroit and Wayne County prosecutors are the busiest of the state's busy kleptomaniacs.

In an ongoing crackdown, Wayne County has seized more than 2,600 vehicles and collected more than $1.2 million in revenue from civil asset forfeiture over the past two years.

A proposed class action has been filed challenging the city's forfeiture program which deprives the owners of their property due to other people's actions. The lawsuit [PDF], filed with the assistance of the Institute for Justice, tells just two of these 2,600 stories. Both involve vehicle owners losing their cars because of someone else's alleged criminal acts -- even when no criminal charges were ever filed.

The first involves a woman who had to file for bankruptcy and now takes the bus because the city decided to take her car from her.

Melisa Ingram, a plaintiff in the lawsuit, knows the many abuses of Detroit’s system firsthand. Last summer her car was seized by Wayne County sheriff’s deputies after she lent it to her then-boyfriend so he could drive to a friend’s barbeque. Later that day, police pulled him over for slowing down in an area known for prostitution. Although he was never charged with a crime, police nevertheless seized Melisa’s 2017 Ford Fusion.

Ingram paid $1,355 to get her car back. Six months later, she again loaned the vehicle to her boyfriend while she attended a barbecue. As he was pulling away from the house, the same Wayne County deputies pulled him over and seized the car again, claiming the house he was leaving was supposedly connected to drugs or prostitution. Just like the previous incident, the car was seized immediately and no criminal charges were filed. Ingram could not afford the $1,800 the police said she had to pay to release her car.

A similar thing happened to another plaintiff -- only this time cops yanked the car out right from underneath him. His story is even stranger, but it had the same end result: law enforcement had one more car in its possession than it did prior to the stop.

In July 2019, a man with whom Robert [Reeves] sometimes works asked him to visit a job site where he was clearing rubbish. The man had a skid-steer loader at the site and wanted to know if Robert knew how to operate it. Robert demonstrated how to use the equipment and the two men planned to meet the next day to begin their work.

Robert then drove to a nearby gas station and went inside to purchase a bottle of water. As he was leaving, officers surrounded him and demanded to know what he knew about a skid steer that was allegedly stolen from Home Depot. Robert knew nothing other than that the other man had rental paperwork from Home Depot, which was consistent with Robert’s understanding that the equipment had been rented. After several hours of detention in the back of a police car, Robert was let go without being arrested. He has not been charged with anything.

Police seized Robert’s Camaro on the spot, along with two cell phones and $2,280 that he had in his pocket.

More than six months have passed since this seizure and Wayne County prosecutors have yet to move forward with forfeiture proceedings. With no proceedings, there's no way to challenge the seizure. Meanwhile, his car sits in an impound lot racking up fees. Reeves was told by the Vehicle Seizure Unit that he would need to hire a lawyer if he wanted to get any answers at all about his car and how to get it back. But all this did was force Reeves to spend more money getting nowhere.

Robert then hired an attorney, but employees of the Vehicle Seizure Unit and Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office refused to speak with his attorney, too. No one will take their calls, despite dozens and dozens of attempts to learn more.

Since the agencies involved in the seizure can keep up to 100% of proceeds from forfeited property, there's zero incentive for them to work with the victims of these programs, much less move forward quickly with forfeiture proceedings. And agencies appear to make it more difficult than the process already is by serving notification -- seemingly deliberately -- to parties other than the owners of the property. In Ingram's case, the first notice went to her boyfriend who was driving the seized car. In Reeve's case, he was never served at all.

These experiences aren't unique. They can't be. A single county doesn't seize more than 3 cars a day if it's not profitable. But unless the law is changed -- or state precedent overturned -- police will continue to take property from innocent owners because being innocent isn't enough to prevent a forfeiture. That's what the plaintiffs are hoping to change. The lawsuit seeks a ruling declaring the state's forfeiture policies unconstitutional -- a violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It's an uphill fight, given state court precedent, but a federal challenge may finally upend the terrible laws that ruin state residents' lives and deprive them of their property without any finding of criminal wrongdoing.

Forfeiture laws make this easy. They make seizing cash so easy hundreds of law enforcement agencies engage in the same fishing trips for cash, ignoring drugs and seizing money from drivers traveling out of the states they're supposed to be defending against incoming drugs.

It's not illegal to travel while carrying large amounts of cash. But it may as well be. The Institute for Justice is representing a 79-year-old man who had his life savings seized by the DEA at an airport -- a seizure that has not been followed up with any official accusations (charges, indictments) of wrongdoing.

Terry [Rolin], 79, is a retired railroad engineer born and raised in Pittsburgh. For many years, he followed his parents’ habit of hiding money in the basement of their home. When Terry moved out of his family home and into a smaller apartment, he became uncomfortable with keeping a large amount of cash. Last summer, when his daughter Rebecca was home for a family event, Terry asked her to take the money and open a new joint bank account that he could use to pay for dental work and to fix his truck, among other needs.

Rolin gave his lifetime savings of $82,373 to his daughter. She checked to see if it was illegal to travel with this large amount of cash. She discovered it wasn't and packed it in her luggage. But a TSA agent spotted the cash and detained her for questioning by Pennsylvania State Troopers. Eventually, she was allowed to leave. But she was stopped by DEA agents when she attempted to board her plane.

Here's what happened then, taken from Rolin and West's proposed class action lawsuit [PDF] against the TSA and DEA:

Despite Rebecca’s explanation, and without probable cause, the DEA agent seized Terry’s life savings because it was greater than $5,000 and was thus considered a “suspicious” amount under DEA’s policy or practice regarding the seizure of cash from travelers at airports.

DEA has continued to hold Terry’s life savings since August 26, 2019, and has taken actions to permanently keep the money using civil forfeiture.

Neither Terry nor Rebecca has been arrested for or charged with any crime.

The initial and continued seizure of Terry’s life savings since August 26, 2019, has prevented him from replacing his teeth and repairing his truck, among other expenses.

According to the TSA's own policies, it should not be scanning people's luggage for "suspicious" amounts of cash. It is only supposed to be concerned with items that threaten airline security, like explosives and weapons. The suit says TSA agents routinely seize cash in contravention of these policies and do so even when it's been determined the traveler and their belongings pose no security threat.

Instead agents flag any "large" amount of currency, which appears to be in the area of $10,000 or more. This is likely due to multiple law enforcement agencies falsely claiming large amounts of currency are suspicious, if not illegal. The DEA leans heavily on the TSA to perform this extraneous screening for it.

The DEA's standards for "suspicion" are even laxer than those unofficially followed by the TSA. According to the lawsuit, the DEA will seize any amount over $5,000 whether or not probable cause exists to perform the seizure. Once the DEA has the money, it will eventually begin forfeiture proceedings. Time is of the essence for those fighting to get their money back, but the DEA is never in any hurry because it's not its money and it has no immediate need for funds.

We already know the DEA is lousy and focused on easy wins, preferably those that involve forfeited funds. But the TSA is part of the problem. It focuses on cash despite it having no statutory authority to seize people simply because they're carrying cash. The TSA does not prohibit people from carrying cash and has produced no evidence to back up its apparent belief these people are more dangerous or likely to be engaged in illegal activities as other passengers not carrying cash.

The lawsuit seeks a declaration finding the TSA and DEA's actions unconstitutional and an injunction forbidding either agency from seizing individuals or their belongings solely on the basis of them carrying cash -- something that is not actually illegal. If it is granted class status, this will make it much easier -- and much less expensive -- for others who have been abused by these federal agencies to demand their money back.

In both cases, the government takes stuff before anything's been proven in court. Only in criminal asset forfeiture does the government have to do much work convincing a judge it should have your property instead of you.

Legalized theft in the United States is scary, abusive, and the target of much criticism. It's a one-sided process that favors the accusers.

But at least you still get to keep the clothes you're wearing, unlike in the Netherlands. Dutch police are willing to disrobe anyone they suspect can't afford (at least not with legally-obtained funds) the clothes on their backs, the watches on their wrists, and any other accoutrements cops think a person couldn't have purchased without ill-gotten gains.

Meanwhile, the UK government allows law enforcement to secure "unexplained wealth orders," which allows them to seize anything someone can't produce receipts for. To move forward with these orders, there has to be at least some articulable suspicion the wealth may have been derived from a serious criminal act. The downside is the power has also been granted to tax collection authorities, which turns less-serious crimes like owing back taxes into "serious" crimes since it's subject to the same legalized theft program. No convictions need to be secured before the government can start taking stuff away from people. And the burden of proof rests almost entirely on the person whose property is being taken.

It appears Trinidad and Tobago has instituted the same sort of government-enabled theft program. And it actually beat the Brits to it by a couple of months. The islands' "explain your wealth" law went into effect in April of this year, but it took until December for anyone to take it out for a test drive.

The law allows law enforcement to freeze/seize assets, utilizing either restriction or forfeiture orders. The process starts with the filing of a request by law enforcement or revenue officers. All the government needs to do is tell the court it suspects the wealth is unexplained. The burden of proof is on the accused.

Where the High Court "is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the total wealth of the respondent exceeds the value of his wealth that was lawfully obtained, it may make a Preliminary Unexplained Wealth Order, requiring the respondent to file a declaration and appear before the High Court to answer questions relative to his assets for the High Court to decide whether to make an Unexplained Wealth Order."

After this, a notice of the making of the Order shall be served on the respondent.

Here's who the government is going after with its first "unexplained wealth order."

A St Helena couple has 28 days to explain their wealth after a High Court judge granted the police an order under new legislation.

Justice Carla Brown-Antoine granted the order on Monday after finding the police had presented enough evidence to justify it.

The order was granted ex-parte.

Under the judge’s orders, the two are each to file a declaration under sections 58(1) and 61(1)of the Civil Asset Recovery and Management and Unexplained Wealth Act within 28 days, and are to appear in court on January 7.

There are few details on who this couple is or why they're suspected of having too much stuff. But it could be anybody, really. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago says the law will be used to go after "bandits who wear gold chains and drive Mercedes Benz and BMWs." Looking for gold and imported cars casts a pretty wide net. There's really no downside for the government since citizens will have to do all the evidentiary heavy lifting.

Oh, and the AG tossed out this horseshit chestnut while arguing on behalf of giving law enforcement the power to strip people of their possessions without having to prove any connection to criminal activity:

If in­no­cent cit­i­zens have noth­ing to fear or hide, the Civ­il As­set Re­cov­ery Un­ex­plained Wealth Bill should not scare them.

This was the mes­sage At­tor­ney Gen­er­al Faris Al-Rawi sent to the pop­u­la­tion in Par­lia­ment yes­ter­day, as he read out the 75-clause bill which seeks to cre­ate a civ­il as­set re­cov­ery and man­age­ment agency for the re­cov­ery of crim­i­nal prop­er­ty through re­stric­tions in deal­ing with civ­il as­sets re­stric­tion, for­fei­ture of crim­i­nal prop­er­ty and the man­age­ment of crim­i­nal prop­er­ty.

Yeah, but the government decides who's innocent. It makes the first judgment call when it requests an order. Then a judge decides whether or not those accused of having too much money can explain why they have the things they have. If the explanations aren't good enough, the government gets to keep the stuff it's seized and the question of innocence (in terms of criminal accusations) goes completely unaddressed.

The forfeiture system in the United States has plenty of perverse incentives. The one in place in Trinidad and Tobago is pretty much nothing but perverse incentives -- a simple way for the government to deprive people of their property with only the thinnest pretense of due process.

The reality is much, much different. For all intents and purposes, civil asset forfeiture is a government crime of opportunity. Any search that yields cash is a win for the agencies that profit from the seizure, even when there's no evidence the cash taken has any link to criminal activity. Pretextual traffic stops, knock-and-talks, stop-and frisk programs… all of these have the potential to turn everyday police work into something profitable.

WFPL's examination of the Louisville (KY) Metro PD's asset forfeiture paperwork shows the agency isn't really targeting drug traffickers and criminal organizations with its seizures. It's just lifting money from whoever it can, like people who've done nothing more than produced an offensive odor. (You are not misreading that sentence.)

Theron Carson and his friends were smoking weed and playing video games when the police showed up at his door.

It was 1 a.m., and the officers told Carson someone complained about the smell. The quickest resolution of the problem, they told Carson, was to allow them to search his Newburg apartment.

After police found his weed and his digital scale, they emptied his wallet. Then they charged him with drug trafficking.

Carson, now 24, says he is not a drug dealer. The $1,200 police took was earned legally, he said, and a mix of rent money, bill money and cash he and his girlfriend socked away in preparation for their daughter's birth.

Carson wanted the money back. Prosecutors offered him a deal that would allow him to plead to a misdemeanor… but only if he surrendered all of the cash.

This is standard operating procedure for the LMPD and the prosecutors it works with. Any cash seized is treated essentially as a bribe arrestees didn't know they were offering. In 25% of the cases examined, charges were dropped in exchange for the LMPD keeping the money.

Local prosecutors pretend the money is not a motivator. They're apparently putting alleged criminals back on the street (minus their cash) because they're just so great at prosecutorial discretion... I guess.

Jefferson County Commonwealth’s Attorney Thomas B. Wine said in an interview with KyCIR that losing cash is the “cost of doing business” if you’re caught with drugs and money, regardless of how the case is resolved.

“To somehow suggest that money is going to make a difference for any of us, at least here on the prosecution side, is ridiculous,” Wine said. “It’s not worth it for the prosecutors that I work with.”

So. Much. Discretion.

Wine estimates nearly 98 percent of cases his office prosecutes are settled with a plea deal.

But no profiting from cash grabs. No sir.

Kentucky law dictates that the police department keeps 85 percent of what it seizes, and the rest goes to the state’s prosecutors.

The LMPD seizes nearly $1 million in cash per year. It takes a while to add up when cops -- utilizing their training and expertise -- are able to turn almost anyone into a "drug trafficker" for the purposes of relieving them of their cash. According to WFPL's investigation, almost 40% of the seizures involved less than $1,000. And yet, officers taking property from arrestees tend to describe any amount of cash as "large" to better fit the drug trafficking narrative being pushed to create charges significant enough to be used as leverage against defendants and their natural desire to be reunited with their seized funds.

Police stopped a man in January 2017 for failing to use a turn signal while leaving “a high narcotics area,” according to an arrest citation. The officer reported smelling marijuana but didn’t find any; instead, a search netted a needle loaded with suspected meth, two pills and a “large amount of money”: $231.

An LMPD officer arrested a man suspected of selling synthetic marijuana at a west Louisville gas station in March 2017. In the arrest citation, the officer noted the man possessed a “large amount of lower denomination bills” in his wallet. The “large” amount of cash officers seized: $33.

These are the people prosecutors ring up on drug trafficking charges. And these are the ones whose cash they take to secure plea deals for lesser charges. Even then, the deliberately-broken system still doesn't work. The $33 kingpin listed above lost his cash and was convicted of drug trafficking.

One more data point: the LMPD's drug dogs are only "right" half the time.

In an analysis of 139 searches since Jan. 1, 2017, in which a dog indicated that drugs were present, 45% turned up no narcotics.

Cops don't know the drug dog is wrong until after the search is completed. The drug dog is really there to give officers permission to perform a warrantless search. On the dog green lights the search, anything discovered can be seized by officers, including whatever cash happens to be in the car or on the driver. A drug dog is a mobile warrant exception.

Programs where random citizens are relieved of cash just because they happen to be in possession of small amounts of drugs isn't going to stop the flow of drugs. They'll continue to flow as freely as citizens' cash into the accounts of the PD and prosecutors. No one's in any hurry to give up this revenue stream, even if law enforcement resources would be better used elsewhere.

What the Texas Tribune uncovered is exactly the reasons asset forfeiture is both problematic and incredibly popular with law enforcement agencies. Cop shop PR officers may hold press conferences to announce things like the $1.2 million in cash seized from a traffic stop, they're very quiet about the day-to-day work of forfeiture. The reality is the $50 million a year taken through forfeiture in the state of Texas is composed of hundreds of very small cash seizures.

• Half of the cash seizures were for less than $3,000. In Harris and Smith counties, more than two-thirds were under $5,000.

• About two of every five forfeiture cases started with a traffic stop.

• Many cases were connected to possession of small amounts of drugs. In Smith County, a woman’s 2003 Chevrolet Trailblazer was seized after police found half of a gram of suspected methamphetamine and a partially-smoked blunt in the car.

• In nearly 60% of the cases, people didn’t fight their seizures in court at all, resulting in judges turning over the property to local governments by default.

• Two of every 10 cases didn’t result in a related criminal charge against the property owner or possessor; in Webb County, more than half didn’t.

• And in about 40% of the cases, no one who had property taken from them was found guilty of a crime connected to the seizure.

Small seizures work out best for law enforcement. The cost of fighting the forfeiture usually outpaces the value of the seized property. This leads directly to the 60% default rate observed by the Texas Tribune. Bypassing criminal charges reduces the amount of time police and prosecutors have to spend processing the case, increasing the profitability of the seizure.

Even in the case of the $1.2 million seizure, no criminal charges were brought. Prosecutors claimed there was no criminal act to pursue since the driver claimed he was unaware of the cash officers found hidden in his trailer. And, under this deliberately-limited scope, there isn't an obvious criminal act the driver could have been charged with. But instead of trying to locate the source of the money assumed to be tied to illegal activity, law enforcement kept the money and presumably allowed a drug operation to continue mostly unimpeded.

The large forfeitures are easier to defend. It not tough to imagine the sudden loss of over $1 million causing at least some disruption in the drug distribution chain. But when cops are taking whatever cash they can find on anyone they pull over or arrest? It's a lot tougher to justify. But prosecutors will still try:

Angela Beavers, the lead civil forfeiture prosecutor for the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, said smaller seizures are common when police bust street dealers, who are an integral cog in drug trafficking organizations.

“Why would we allow the street level dealers to profit from their crimes? These are the dealers that ruin communities and families,” she said in an email.

But when the numbers are examined, these words ring hollow. It seems law enforcement cares more about the money being made by selling drugs, than the drugs themselves -- when the drugs would seem to be more instrumental to "ruining communities and families."

“I-35 is basically your main artery into the city from the rest of North America,” said Joe Baeza, a spokesperson for the Laredo Police Department. “We’re the beginning of the yellow brick road here.”

He said a U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint inspects vehicles heading north into Texas, and local cops often keep an eye out for drug proceeds traveling south. Webb County agencies made two seizures — a 2012 Dodge Ram and a 2008 BMW 5-series — from northbound stops after finding drugs in both vehicles, compared with 16 cash seizures from southbound lanes.

Even in counties where convictions were tied to forfeitures, it's still small amounts of cash tied to small possession charges. The most abusive aspect of forfeiture may have been removed, but there's still no indication this law enforcement tool is being used to dismantle drug cartels and stem the flow of drugs into communities.

It's no wonder Texas law enforcement agencies have pushed back against forfeiture reporting requirements, as well as tying this practice to convictions. The numbers pulled directly from filings shows the practice is mainly used to enrich law enforcement agencies, one small seizure at a time. There's nothing in here that shows this is benefiting Texas residents in any way.

If law enforcement was serious about crippling drug cartels, they wouldn't be watching the roads leading out of their jurisdictions for drivers to pull over and shake down for cash. They'd be watching roads leading into the state to seize the drugs before they can be sold. But that's not how it's done. Drug busts are rare. Cash seizures -- especially small ones -- happen all the time.

When a Nashville television news team followed police officers working I-40 as part of a highway interdiction task force not unlike South Carolina’s Rolling Thunder, it found officers did not work the east- and westbound lanes equally. Rather, they seemed to prefer the westbound side even though they were more likely to find drugs on the eastbound side, as smugglers transported them to Nashville and other cities to the east. A possible explanation for this observation is that officers knew they were more likely to find drug money on the westbound side, as smugglers transported it back to Mexico or the West Coast. Records confirmed officers made 10 times as many stops on the westbound side as they did on the eastbound.

You'll notice law enforcement never brings stats to the discussion. All officials bring are talking points. Most states don't require any level of reporting on seizures and the law enforcement spending that flows from these. The opacity has allowed a law enforcement tool to become an unaudited revenue stream, providing agencies with all the incentive they need to turn traffic stops into lucrative fishing expeditions.

Fortunately, those opposed to the abusive practice will have even more facts to work with, thanks to a new study [PDF] by Dr. Brian D. Kelly of the Institute for Justice. Millions of dollars flow into law enforcement agencies every year from forfeiture, but this has yet to provide the public with any return on the forced investment.

More equitable sharing funds do not translate into more crimes solved. This suggests that despite claims forfeiture turns criminals’ cash into more resources for law enforcement, the additional revenue is not improving overall police effectiveness in crime fighting.

More equitable sharing funds also do not mean less drug use, even though proponents argue forfeiture helps rid the streets of drugs by financially crippling drug dealers and cartels.

When local economies suffer, equitable sharing activity increases, suggesting police make greater use of forfeiture when local budgets are tight. A 1 percentage point increase in local unemployment—a standard proxy for fiscal stress—is associated with a statistically significant 9 percentage point increase in equitable sharing seizures.

That's two popular arguments directly disproven. The first one -- that forfeiture allows agencies to purchase the tech and tools they need to fight crime successfully -- is disproven by the lack of results. Sure, agencies are loading up on equipment and spy gear, but clearance rates on criminal investigations aren't tracking with the increased cash flow. Using law enforcement data, the IJ can't find any link between asset forfeiture and law enforcement efficiency.

Results suggest forfeiture does not help police solve more crime. The results of these analyses were statistically insignificant at conventional levels, suggesting additional forfeiture revenue does not translate into more crimes solved. But even if the results were significant, the relationship between forfeiture and crime clearance would be vanishingly small. For example, the LEMAS [Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics] data for municipal police suggest a $1,000 increase in equitable sharing funds per officer would mean solving just 2.4 more crimes per 1,000 reported offenses. So if an agency’s clearance rate were, say, 270 per 1,000 offenses, receiving $1,000 more in equitable sharing funds per officer would mean increasing the clearance rate to just 272.4. A $1,000 increase in funds per officer would be substantial—total equitable sharing averages less than half of this—yet such a windfall would make only a minor difference. Moreover, such tiny improvements in clearance rates would diminish as forfeiture revenue increases; for example, the first $500 per officer in a given year would have a greater impact than the second $500 per officer. These results suggest claims about forfeiture’s crime-fighting importance are, at best, overstated.

The second talking point -- that forfeiture cripples drug dealers and cartels -- also has no factual basis. Again, the numbers contradict the claims. Using the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) carried out by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the IJ found no correlation between asset forfeiture and reductions in drug use, suggesting drugs are still just as easy to obtain.

From 2002 through 2014, the survey underwent no major relevant changes, making it possible to directly compare results over time. This feature allowed me to explore whether increases in equitable sharing proceeds received by agencies within a particular NSDUH region were associated with reductions in drug use in those same regions. I controlled for police agency staffing, which could affect police effectiveness, as well as for demographic and economic factors sometimes associated with drug use: the proportion of the population age 15–24, the minority proportion of the population and the unemployment rate. The four NSDUH drug use measures I used were (1) use of any illicit drug in the previous year, (2) marijuana use in the previous year, (3) nonmedical use of prescription pain relievers in the previous year and (4) cocaine use in the previous year.

For none of these illicit drug use measures did I find increases in equitable sharing proceeds led to subsequent reductions in use. In short, to the extent forfeiture advocates hope increasing enforcement through forfeiture will reduce drug use, this does not appear to be happening.

What the report did find is something unexpected: the more financially-stressed an area is, the more likely it is law enforcement will make it worse. Forfeitures increase as unemployment increases, suggesting financially-strapped agencies are stepping up forfeiture efforts to make up for budget shortfalls.

In every case, I found that higher unemployment predicted more equitable sharing activity. For equitable sharing overall as well as for both joint operations and adoptions, the link between unemployment and both value of assets forfeited and number of assets seized was statistically significant. With respect to equitable sharing overall, a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment was associated with an 8.5 percentage point increase in the value of forfeited assets and a 9.5 percentage point increase in the number of assets seized…

The study confirms what's always been suspected: asset forfeiture directly enriches law enforcement agencies but provides zero benefit to the communities the agencies serve. That's the very definition of abuse. Cops are using citizens as ATMs while drug cartels thrive. The data clearly shows the only negative impact of serious asset forfeiture reforms will be an increase in complaints from law enforcement officials.

Law enforcement will be severely handicapped if state lawmakers succumb to the misconception that no forfeiture should take place without a conviction on proceeds under $50,000.

[...]

Drugs may not be present, but everything else confirms and indicates drug trafficking, i.e., ledger books, scales, pre-recorded narcotics buy funds and packaging materials. In this particular scenario, as well as a multitude of others, the police and prosecutors could not establish a case to seize anything if Michigan adopts the $50,000 threshold.

All this evidence and nothing to do with it, I guess. Like many in the law enforcement field, Stevenson clings to the myth that robbing random people at gunpoint somehow cripples drug cartels. This belief is backed by far less evidence than the long list of stuff Stevenson claims can't be cobbled into a successful prosecution. We're more than 40 years deep into a War on Drugs and the only thing that's changed for the positive is the public's attitude towards civil asset forfeiture.

Michigan's legislature is considering adding a conviction requirement for forfeitures under $50,000. Opponents of property rights and due process keep crawling out of the woodwork, offering up increasingly nonsensical defenses of forfeiture. But nothing is stupider than this prosecutor's objection:

”Since a conviction is now required, it will make it extremely difficult to prosecute high level drug dealers,” Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy said via email.

REQUIRING PROSECUTORS TO PROSECUTE DRUG DEALERS WILL MAKE IT HARDER TO PROSECUTE DRUG DEALERS.

This kind of reasoning suggests the real problem with closing the deal, prosecution-wise, might be the prosecutor's arguments.

It doesn't get worse from there. But it certainly doesn't get any better. Allowing Worthy to expand on this theory does not bring enlightenment or clarification. It just makes the theory bigger and dumber.

“Often in these cases, witnesses are intimidated to the point that they do not show up for trial, sometimes losing their lives because of the retaliation,” Worthy said. “It is our fear that this will get worse now that drug dealers know that if there are no witnesses, there will be no conviction and they can get their property back.”

How in fuck do you draw the line from "taking cash from some dude cops pulled over" to "witness intimidation?" This is the brilliant legal mind handling prosecutions for Michigan's largest city. All this says is that forfeiture was never about keeping drugs and drug dealers off the street. It was always about the cash. We know this, but cops and prosecutors will never say it out loud. Worthy's attempt to portray almost-suspicionless cash seizures as leverage in prosecutions the government NEVER PLANS TO PURSUE is inadvertently transparent.

The only argument that could be worse than Worthy's defense is the truth: cops and prosecutors prefer taking property because it's easier and it enriches them personally. But we should expect nothing less (nothing more?) from a prosecutor who once asserted there's a link between real-life and video game violence, stating "no one" could "convince" her otherwise, no matter what evidence they presented. Seems like evidence and assertions are never in the same place when Worthy's in charge. I can see why she's so opposed to doing a job she's clearly not qualified to perform.

The complaint filed against the money made a lot of claims about the government's suspicions this was money destined for drug purchases. Supposedly evidence was recovered from seized phones suggested the two men were involved in drug trafficking, utilizing a third person's money. Despite all of this evidence, prosecutors never went after the men. They only went after the money.

Records searches of both state and federal courts did not identify any criminal charges against Li, Peng or Huang.

Even the speeding that predicated the stop (in which a drug dog "alerted" on the rental vehicle that contained no drugs) went unprosecuted.

This is where the stupid begins: alleged drug dealers allowed to continue their drug dealing by state and federal agencies more interested in the men's cash.

But it gets stupider. This was offered up in the complaint against the seized money as evidence of the men's criminal activities.

Authorities noted in the complaint he lived “9 houses” away from the site of a residence where drug transactions were occurring and a contact in his phone was recently the subject of a civil forfeiture action.

That's some mighty fine evidence. If you happen to live in the same neighborhood as a known criminal, I guess you're a criminal, too. That's just how society works, ladies and gentlemen. Move to a better neighborhood if you don't want to be lumped in with your worst neighbors.

The other part is stupid, too. According to this line of thought, if law enforcement has stolen cash and property from someone in your Contacts list, you must be a criminal. Only criminals would associate with people whose stuff has been taken by the government but have never been convicted of criminal activity.

Also apparently suspicious: traveling and not attempting to avoid mandated IRS reporting.

Peng had a number of bank transactions the complaint states were “highly unusual” including multiple deposits and wire transactions for about $100,000 each. Financial records also showed three trips between Chicago and California and one from Chicago to New York in a three-month period between November 2016 and January 2017.

You just can't win. Keep deposits too low (under $10,000) and the federal government thinks you're engaged in structuring. Keep them well above the mandatory reporting mark and you're probably a drug dealer.

It appears the agencies involved in this seizure didn't think they had enough real evidence to follow through on this forfeiture. More than two years after the $626,000 was seized, the government is returning it to its rightful owners. That's where the vindictiveness comes in. The government hasn't won a criminal or civil case against any of the people involved, but it's still going to keep a third of the cash just because.

U.S. District Attorney for Western Missouri Tim Garrison, in a settlement agreement dated April 25, wrote the government will return almost $418,000 to claimant Lu Li, of Chicago, and will keep almost $209,000.

Even when the government loses, it still wins. One-third of $626,000 remains in the hands of a government that couldn't prove anything it alleged, even in a civil case where the standard of proof is considerably lower.

In the end, we have three people short $200,000 and a government that can't competently prosecute people or their money, even when the latter can't defend itself in civil forfeiture litigation. [waves American flag with one blue stripe frantically while humming 'The Ballad of the Green Berets" for some reason]

The practice always has its defenders. Most of those defenders come from the same agencies that are directly profiting from asset forfeiture. They say the expected stuff about fighting the good Drug War -- that taking $500 from a random motorist somehow creates a ripple effect felt all the way at the top of the drug distribution chain. Everyone knows they're full of shit, but there are enough true believers in most state legislatures that the practice remains largely unaltered across the United States.

But there are some outliers. Some people see the perverse incentives asset forfeiture creates and say perverted cops are the best cops.

Jarrod Bruder, the executive director of the South Carolina Sheriff's Association who frequently lobbies for law enforcement interests at the Statehouse, said that without the incentive of profit from civil forfeiture, officers probably wouldn't pursue drug dealers and their cash as hard as they do now.

If police don't get to keep the money from forfeiture, "what is the incentive to go out and make a special effort?" Bruder said. "What is the incentive for interdiction?"

I don't know... how about IT'S YOUR FUCKING JOB. This is a law enforcement professional who actually thinks cops won't do cop work unless they can periodically seize cash from people they interact with. Hey, Mr. Bruder, if cops can't solicit bribes or extort protection money from local businesses, why should they be bothered to patrol neighborhoods or respond to robbery calls?

If Wells Fargo account reps can't sign people up for accounts without their knowledge or permission, why should they even show up to help people open accounts or deal with banking issues? If an entrepreneur can't rope investors into a pyramid scheme, why even bother getting out of bed at 4 am to bathe in the glow of inflated self-worth? Come on, Bruder. How can you be so obtuse?

There's nothing quite like a law enforcement union rep telling the public the police are only willing to work when they can directly profit from their efforts. That's the kind of word-of-mouth advertising asset forfeiture reform efforts need... courtesy of a union rep who doesn't want the practice ended, much less altered.

That's the stupidest thing said in defense of asset forfeiture in this article from the Greenville News, which gathers law enforcement responses to its investigation of the unsavory tactics deployed by state agencies. Even victims of crime aren't off limits. Local cops will take money right off the kitchen counter when investigating murders and claim the $43 pocketed was the result of criminal activity.

But it's not the only stupid thing said by law enforcement reps defending forfeiture.

Clemson Police Chief Jimmy Dixon said if police didn't get to collect forfeiture money, it would hamper the department's ability to conduct long-term drug surveillance.

"It could potentially shut down our K-9 unit," he said. "Overall, our ability to conduct undercover narcotics operations could be stifled."

Lt. Jake Mahoney with the Aiken Police Department said they'd have to divert money from the budget to cover drug enforcement.

Greenwood Police Chief Gerald Brooks said it would "sharply curtail our drug enforcement activities."

Sounds like another set of cops with motivation problems. But even if you believe they're not like the union rep quoted above them, they're still complaining about possibly not being able to do something they're not legally allowed to do.

Forfeiture proceeds are not meant to be written into a budget or counted on for recurring expenses, but should be treated as a supplement to provide for extra training or equipment, according to the law and legal opinions.

Those are the arguments in favor of asset forfeiture: cops won't do their job if they can't earn cash on the side and budgets, that aren't supposed to include forfeiture funds, will experience shortfalls because chickens cops aren't supposed to count will no longer be hatched. Nice work, so-called drug warriors. It isn't -- and never has been -- about dismantling the drug trade. If law enforcement ever made a serious dent in crime, the extra money would dry up. And that's something they're just not going to allow to happen.

That conflict [of interest] is on full display in Richland, Miss., where construction of a new $4.1 million law enforcement training facility was funded entirely by forfeiture proceeds garnered by police in Richland—a town of just 7,000 people. A sign in the building’s window boasts: “Richland Police Station tearfully donated by drug dealers.”

And this:

Mississippi drug warriors had their eye on nearly $300,000 in "forfeited" funds but threw it all away by issuing one of the most deficient search warrants ever. It's not that it was loaded with errors or questionable probable cause assertions. It's that it omitted perhaps the single most important element of a search warrant -- the location being searched.

When the forfeiture is a foregone conclusion, small towns end up with multi-million dollar facilities and supposed drug warriors with an eye on someone else's money can't even be bothered to fill out the paperwork. The reforms were needed and Governor Phil Bryant approved them.

Not that it mattered to local law enforcement.

Mississippi police agencies have been seizing cash, guns and vehicles without legal authority for months after a state law changed and police didn't notice.

An Associated Press review of a Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics database shows more than 60 civil asset forfeitures with nearly $200,000 in property taken by state and local agencies under a law that lapsed on June 30.

The state's cops just kept taking stuff under the old rules. And why not? They weren't detail oriented under the old system. That wasn't going to change just because legislators passed a law directly affecting their work. It certainly didn't matter to law enforcement that the top official in the state -- Governor Phil Bryant -- had given his approval of the reforms by signing the bill into law.

Apparently it doesn't matter to Governor Phil Bryant either.

If you can't read/see the tweet, here's the Mississippi governor telling residents they and their precious Constitutional rights can go fuck themselves.

When drug dealers have taken over your neighborhood, call a Constitutional scholar and see how that works out for you.

Governor Bryant's tweet links to the Mississippi Center for Public Policy, which has just sent him a letter asking him (and other state legislators) not to roll back the minor reforms that went into effect last year. His tweet directly mocks Ilya Shapiro, the Constitutional scholar quoted in the Center's post. And it directly mocks everyone who saw law enforcement abusing a weapon in its drug war arsenal to strip property from citizens with almost zero accountability or avenues of recourse.

In short, Governor Bryant thinks cops should have more rights and people not even accused of crimes should have less. That's an extremely shitty look for someone representing one of the fifty states of the United States of America.

The Greenville News has put together an in-depth report on asset forfeiture in South Carolina, culled from asset forfeiture cases run through the state's court system. What it found is unsurprising, but still shocking. The article opens with a small sampling of injustices perpetrated by the criminal justice system.

When a man barged into Isiah Kinloch’s apartment and broke a bottle over his head, the North Charleston resident called 911. After cops arrived on that day in 2015, they searched the injured man’s home and found an ounce of marijuana.

So they took $1,800 in cash from his apartment and kept it.

When Eamon Cools-Lartigue was driving on Interstate 85 in Spartanburg County, deputies stopped him for speeding. The Atlanta businessman wasn’t criminally charged in the April 2016 incident. Deputies discovered $29,000 in his car, though, and decided to take it.

When Brandy Cooke dropped her friend off at a Myrtle Beach sports bar as a favor, drug enforcement agents swarmed her in the parking lot and found $4,670 in the car.

Her friend was wanted in a drug distribution case, but Cooke wasn’t involved. She had no drugs and was never charged in the 2014 bust. Agents seized her money anyway.

She worked as a waitress and carried cash because she didn’t have a checking account. She spent more than a year trying to get her money back.

Cash is king in South Carolina. Law enforcement loves taking it. Under the pretense of dismantling drug syndicates, law enforcement officers are taking money from waitresses, businessmen, and crime victims. Cash motivates law enforcement efforts -- dubious drug-focused shakedowns that are often given far too much credibility by local journalists.

This is state where county sheriffs run week-long events with cool names like "Rolling Thunder" and claim they're disrupting the flow of drugs. The reality is there's no disruption. People are separated from their cash and other property, but arrests and convictions are almost impossible to find, despite the discovery of a few hundred pounds of illegal substances. In 2017, the Spartansburg County Sheriff's Department pulled over more than 1,100 vehicles during an operation, searched 158 of them, recovered enough drugs to fill a table for a press conference, but only ended up with eight felony convictions. It did end up with $139,000 in cash, which was the actual focus of the "drug interdiction" activity.

The cases gathered from elsewhere in the state tell the same story: cash-hungry law enforcement agencies taking money from people and calling it a victory in the War on Drugs. African-Americans make up only 13 percent of the state's population, but 65 percent of asset forfeiture cases target African Americans. If you're white, you're not only targeted less frequently but you're twice as likely to get your property returned to you.

Since the state's laws allow 95 percent of everything seized to go to the law enforcement agency performing the seizure, officers are far more focused on cash than securing convictions.

Nearly one-fifth of people who had their assets seized weren't charged with a related crime. Out of more than 4,000 people hit with civil forfeiture over three years, 19 percent were never arrested. They may have left a police encounter without so much as a traffic ticket. But they also left without their cash.

And it's rarely ever taken from dealers. More than half of all cash seizures involved less than $1,000, suggesting officers are more than happy to lift cash from users, leaving the flow of drug traffic completely uninterrupted.

The Greenville News has compiled several disturbing stories of asset forfeiture abuse in another article. These highlight the mercenary tactics of law enforcement agencies which often appear to take money just because they can. In one despicable episode, they searched a house after one of its residents was killed there. When officers found a small amount of drugs, they decided to take all the loose cash they could find, which included $1,700 in bag and $43 found on the kitchen counter. Then, the agency sent the notice of forfeiture to the man they knew was dead -- the same person whose murder they were investigating. It took a court to call bullshit on this and force the agency to serve notice to the murder victim's estate. Even then, the executor of his estate was only able to recover half the cash the officers took.

South Carolina is badly in need of asset forfeiture reform. Unfortunately, no one has been able to push a bill past the formative stages. Given the 95% profit ensured by current laws, any proposed reform is going to face stiff resistance from law enforcement agencies that will feel the state is stealing from them, rather than seeking to prevent them from stealing from citizens.

When officials in the tiny Town of Stettin in Marathon County went to collect a civil judgment from 75-year-old Roger Hoeppner this month, they sent 24 armed officers.

And an armored military vehicle.

This decision made national news in 2014. In the wake of the Ferguson protests, it was considered bad form to be turning normal police work into military maneuvers. But the Sheriff's office didn't care. Sheriff's Captain Greg Bean said 24 deputies and a military vehicle were a proportionate response. Deputies were needed to haul away the junk that had prompted the $80,000 civil settlement and Hoeppner had been known to be "argumentative" in the past.

But the fact is the squad of deputies could have shown up after the judgment and other legal issues had all been sorted out and someone being contentious in the presence of law enforcement officers is hardly justification for the use of an armored vehicle.

This bit of bad optics and worse judgment had resulted in another setback for Marathon County. As [former cop/current lawyer] Greg Prickett pointed out, it has also proven the local government sucks at math. The law enforcement man-hours and legal fees incurred by the county has turned its $80,000 judgment into at least a $10,000 loss.

A 79-year-old Wisconsin man who was arrested when two dozen deputies brought an armored vehicle to his home to enforce a civil judgment has settled his civil rights claim against Marathon County for $90,000.

I guess this stops the bleeding. At least local taxpayers can be grateful for that. If this had proceeded to trial, it likely would have run the county further into the red.

U.S. District Judge Barbara Crabb dismissed Hoeppner's claim that the decision to enforce the civil judgment with so many deputies and the armored vehicle was unreasonable but said his claims that he was arrested without probable cause and that deputies violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights when they seized his phone and camera should go to a jury.

The county knows when it's beat. Hilariously, the same behavior that resulted in an $80,000 judgment against the 75-year-old -- the accumulation of used pallets and old mechanical equipment on Hoeppner's property -- continues to this day. The only change is the county no longer hassles Hoeppner about the stuff he keeps on his property. No more fines have been handed down and the county government no longer sends deputies by the dozen to keep Hoeppner in line. This whole debacle can't even be considered a Pyrrhic victory. It's been nothing but loss after loss -- in actual dollars and in collective government PR.

Other restraints will hopefully eliminate local law enforcement's worst practices -- like seizing someone's house because their kid sold $40 of drugs to a police informant. It also should slow down seizures of whatever's in a person's pockets by forbidding forfeitures of under $250 entirely.

The consent decree obviously won't solve everything, and part of the problem is the consent decree itself. It forbids seizures of less than $1,000 unless the property is evidence in an ongoing case. Guess what local law enforcement is doing.

In November 2017, Iyo Bishop of Philadelphia was arrested on assault charges after a boyfriend, who she said was abusive, accused her of striking him with an SUV. City police picked her up after spotting the vehicle parked on the street weeks later. Bishop maintained her innocence but was cuffed and thrown in a squad car. She then watched in disbelief as an officer hopped in her 2002 Jeep Liberty and drove off.

Although the charges against Bishop were eventually dropped, she never saw her vehicle again. Police sold the Jeep at auction for $1,155 in storage fees they had assessed while the case made its way through the court system.

As this report by Ryan Briggs of The Appeal shows, the consent decree basically codifies this behavior. Cops seize vehicles when making arrests, ticking one of the requirement boxes. Then they claim the vehicle is evidence, ticking the other box.

Older vehicles worth less than $1,000 simply sit in impound lots racking up fees while the accused's case languishes in the court system. The vehicle can't be returned until the criminal case is processed, so it doesn't take long for impound fees to outweigh the vehicle's value. All of this is completely beyond the control of the person's whose car has been seized.

Even if charges are dismissed or the accused is cleared of wrongdoing, the car's owner still owes these fees. Every day they can't pay it, the total increases. Sooner or later, the vehicle will be auctioned. Now the innocent person has no vehicle and is still ultimately liable for uncollected fees.

This allows cops to make money on seized vehicles even if the vehicle isn't seized from someone suspected of criminal activity. It can happen to crime victims as well.

In 2014, Karin Foley and her husband, Willis, were moving from New York State to South Carolina when their vehicle blew a tire in Pennsylvania. When Willis Foley pulled the car over and got out to change the tire, a semi struck and killed him. Pennsylvania State Police later determined that the truck driver had been at the wheel for nearly 30 hours straight.

But the state troopers who responded to the accident impounded the Foleys’ diesel pickup and a horse trailer packed with their possessions as evidence. Like Bishop, Karin Foley never saw the truck, the trailer, or any of her belongings again.

The criminal case against the trucker dragged on for three years but never made it to trial. In May, he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. State police called Foley a few months later to tell her that she had one week to travel to Pennsylvania—hundreds of miles from her South Carolina home—or they would auction her truck and trailer.

And auction it they did. The seized evidence was never used in court and local law enforcement immediately flipped the seized vehicle for unearned profit. To top it off, the coroner billed the widow $175 for her husband's body bag.

While it's understandable some property will be seized as evidence in criminal cases, fees shouldn't be charged to those found innocent or to victims of criminal activity. This is just another form of forfeiture that provides almost no avenue of recourse to property owners other than paying the government to give them back their stuff.

For those familiar with the process of civil asset forfeiture, the contents of the guide are mostly unsurprising. Despite the document dating back to 2010, ICE did confirm the version seen by The Intercept is its most recent guidance. ICE is allowed to seize property without bringing charges or securing convictions -- something still permitted by federal law (your state laws may vary) and greatly encouraged by the new head of the DOJ, Jeff Sessions.

What is surprising about the document is how much emphasis is placed on the seizure of real estate. As Ryan Devereaux and Spencer Woodman point out, ICE's forfeiture teams are pretty much property flippers, albeit ones working with the undeniable advantage of making zero initial investment.

Much of the handbook is devoted to describing the process of seizing real estate — homes, farms, and businesses — and it is in these pages that the dual priorities of financial gain and law enforcement objectives become most apparent. While the handbook contains little discussion on how to utilize asset forfeiture to maximize crime-fighting outcomes, there is extensive discussion of how agents should painstakingly determine whether a property is valuable enough to make seizure worthwhile

[...]

More than a dozen pages of the document describe an important — if perhaps surprising — role of AIRG agents: as real estate appraisers. Using the example of “houses used to store narcotics or harbor illegal aliens,” the manual walks agents through a comprehensive process of assessing homes and landed properties to determine the financial appeal to ICE of acquiring such real estate.

If ICE can obtain a warrant to search the property it plans to seize, it will usually send a private real estate appraiser along during the search. AIRG [Asset Identification and Removal Group] agents apparently ballpark property values using public databases -- something that tells ICE whether or not it should move forward with the forfeiture.

As is the case in most civil forfeiture operations, the connecting tissue of criminal activity doesn't need to be much more than gossamer-thin.

The manual instructs agents seeking to seize a property to work with confidential informants, scour tax records, and even obtain an interception warrant to determine whether “a telephone located on the property was used to plan or discuss criminal activity” in order to justify seizing the property.

You would think the phone would be the "guilty" property -- at least as far as you can follow forfeiture's twisted logic. Apparently not. According to ICE's guidance, the entire house around the landline is equally culpable.

The handbook also points out civil forfeiture is preferable to criminal forfeiture, thanks to its general disdain for due process. The key factor is the conviction itself -- something you'd think a law enforcement agency would value over seized property. In criminal proceedings, seized property is generally returned if the charges don't stick. Not so with civil forfeiture. ICE's guidance says when in doubt, go civil. That way the agency may still keep something, even if the alleged perp goes free.

ICE is by far the biggest contributor to the DHS's total forfeiture take. This can be expected to grow with the new administration's intense focus on illegal immigration. As with any government program experiencing sudden growth, one can expect an exponential leap in abuse.

In a major win for private property rights, a federal judge ruled that Indiana can no longer seize vehicles under its controversial civil forfeiture laws, which allow police to confiscate property without filing criminal charges. Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson ruled that Indiana's laws were unconstitutional because they failed to provide a timely hearing for the property owner to contest the seizure.

The case springs from an arrest and seizure made last September when the plaintiff was pulled over by Indianapolis law enforcement. Finding a small amount of marijuana on the driver, the Indy PD felt justified in claiming his entire vehicle as its own. Not content to be screwed out of a car for his personal use stash, Leroy Washington enlisted the help of defense lawyer Jeff Cardella. They filed a class action lawsuit challenging the state's forfeiture law on behalf of the hundreds of drivers whose cars have ended up in the possession of Indiana law enforcement -- all without being convicted of any criminal activity.

Seizing cars is something Indiana law enforcement does frequently. According to the stats quoted by the judge, the state seizes around 11 cars a week. Once the vehicles are in the law enforcement's possession, drivers are forbidden from seeking to regain their property until the state says it's OK to do so. And it's generally in no hurry to do so. It can hold the vehicle for six months before starting forfeiture proceedings, forcing car owners to find other transportation while their vehicles sit in impound lots.

As the judge notes in the decision [PDF], this law -- which locks car owners out of the loop for months -- poses significant problems for people who haven't been convicted of criminal activity.

Following a seizure, the government may hold a vehicle without taking any action for 180 days, or for 90 days after receiving written notice from the owner demanding the vehicle's return. Ind. Code § 34-24-1-3. During this timeframe, the owner of the property has no ability to challenge the seizure, because replevin is prohibited by the statute. Ind. Code § 34- 24-1-2(c) (“Property that is seized under subsection (a) … is not subject to replevin but is considered to be in the custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure.”).

Therefore, three to six months may elapse, during which time the owner is deprived of the use of his vehicle, and the government is not required to take any action whatsoever regarding the seized property. It is particularly problematic that the statute specifically bars replevin. Absent another statutorily created mechanism to challenge the deprivation, replevin would provide a vehicle owner’s only recourse. But that avenue has been specifically foreclosed by the statute. During those months, if the owner has secured financing to purchase the vehicle, he is still required to make payments on that loan, lest he risk foreclosure and repossession. He is also required, of course, to make other arrangements for his transportation needs, which may include fundamental life activities such as transit to a job or school, visits to health care professionals, and caretaking for children or other family members. It is evident to this Court that a three- to six-month deprivation is a lengthy one, and could cause significant hardship to the individual whose vehicle is seized.

[...]

Second, unlike some states’ statutes, Indiana’s forfeiture provisions do not allow for interim relief during the pendency of proceedings. Such interim relief could include returning the seized vehicle subject to the posting of a surety bond or other adequate security. [...] The absence of an opportunity for interim relief particularly burdens individuals who lack the financial resources to secure another vehicle during the pendency of proceedings, or who are unable to access reliable public transportation.

As the court concludes, this process -- enabled by state law -- makes a mockery of Constitutional rights.

[I]ndiana Code Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1), as read in conjunction with the statutory provisions of the same chapter, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court therefore permanently enjoins Defendants from enforcing that statutory provision.

This is exactly the conclusion Indiana's law enforcement didn't want the court to reach. In hopes of heading off the lawsuit (and this precedent), the state argued the return of Washington's vehicle rendered the case moot. The court doesn't care for this dodge, and points out it's exactly the sort of move anticipated both by Washington's earlier briefs and the court itself:

The Court concludes (as it did in its order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss) that Washington has established that the inherently transitory doctrine applies here. First, it is uncertain that a claim will remain live for any individual who could be named as a plaintiff long enough for a court to certify the class. The statute itself limits the pre-forfeiture period to 180 days. As the procedural history of this case illustrates, despite a district court’s best efforts to provide prompt resolution to all pending matters, the realities of a district court’s docket and case load (along with the possibility that the parties may need additional time to conduct discovery related to class certification) may result in motions to certify being unresolved for longer than 180 days. In this case, Washington’s Motion to Certify a Class was filed on November 2, 2016—more than 180 days before the issuance of an order resolving it. [Filing No. 3.] And, as the State retains discretion to return the seized property to its owner at any time, it could attempt to moot any named plaintiff’s claim by simply returning the property after the plaintiff files a motion to certify.

It further points out mooting Washington wouldn't moot the class action, which includes everyone similarly situated -- both now and in the future.

Second, there will be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation complained of in the Complaint. Defendants have not indicated any intention to cease enforcement of the statute, and Defendants do not dispute that at least 169 vehicles have been seized for forfeiture between November 2, 2016 and February 13, 2017.

The end result is a federal injunction preventing Indiana law enforcement from seizing vehicles without better recovery routes available for car owners. Since the adjoining clause walking all over the Constitution hasn't been rewritten yet, this pretty much means the end of vehicle seizures until that's addressed by the legislature. Considering state lawmakers were already considering forfeiture reforms, this might mark the permanent end of taking cars away from people without obtaining corresponding convictions.

As part of the new president's "law and order" focus, Attorney General Jeff Sessions opened up the federal outlet for forfeiture, allowing state and local law enforcement agencies to route around local restrictions by asking for federal "adoption" of their forfeitures. This reversed the policy put in place by Sessions' predecessor, which limited adoptions and forced local agencies to adhere to local rules.

Terwilliger, who has cut more than one federal forfeiture check, claims there's nothing wrong with civil asset forfeiture. And if there is, the solution isn't less of it.

Last week Attorney General Jeff Sessions restarted the longstanding practice, suspended by the Obama administration in 2015, of allowing state authorities to use federal forfeiture procedures. Mr. Sessions also introduced important safeguards to protect innocent people.

Still, critics challenged the practice’s reinstatement, citing instances when police wrongly took property from people who turned out to be innocent. The correct response to such concerns, however, isn’t to end asset forfeiture but to fix it.

Terwilliger offers no fixes. Instead, he heads down the Forfeiture Trail of Tears, reminding readers that drug dealers are bad and the things they do are bad.

Every day brings news of American families devastated by violence or drug use. Overdoses are a common occurrence. These tragedies are the work of criminal gangs that flood the streets with drugs and turn urban cores into combat zones. Such gangs exist for one simple reason: to make money.

No one arguing against civil asset forfeiture disputes these facts. All people are asking for is the government to secure a conviction before making off with someone's property. Terwilliger complains it's too difficult to tie cash and property to drug kingpins. Again, no one is saying this isn't difficult. But grabbing money, cars, houses, etc. from people without convicting them doesn't have more of an effect on them than taking their stuff and locking up their employees.

Whatever happened to using convictions as leverage? You know, encouraging someone to hand over info on higher-ups to secure a better plea deal? Apparently, this is no longer a significant part of the Drug War process. Instead, cops are just taking anything that isn't nailed down and telling themselves they're helping bring down kingpins, rather than just taking stuff because the law says they can.

Terwilliger -- still coasting right past the "fixing it" issue he brought up at the beginning of his op-ed -- claims the new rules are even more protective than the previous rules. The new rules force the government to move faster when filing for forfeiture, which will prevent agencies from sitting on someone else's property for months before giving them a chance to contest it. He also notes the DOJ will (theoretically) be less likely to "adopt" seizures under $10,000. But then he acts as though local agencies and the feds aren't all playing on the same team:

Scrutiny of these types of seizures by Justice Department lawyers will be ratcheted up to prevent and catch any overuse or abuse.

This seems unlikely. And the new rules already allow abuse by giving local agencies a way to skirt local forfeiture restrictions. The new rules also make future abuse more likely by encouraging local agencies to move ahead with forfeitures they normally wouldn't see a cent of, on the off-chance the DOJ will pick it up and cut them a check later.

Terwilliger also adds this fact-free assessment of civil asset forfeiture.

Police generally are careful and conscientious, including with asset forfeiture, which is why wrongful seizures are the exception. Smart law-enforcement leaders also know that if the practice is abused and innocent people are hurt, they could lose access to this valuable tool.

First, a low number of seizure challenges should not be viewed as a general indicator of the "rightfulness" of the majority of seizures. Challenging forfeitures is expensive and time-consuming. In many cases, the amount of money needed to challenge a forfeiture outweighs the value of the property seized. This is why a large majority of seizures nationwide weigh in at less than $1,000.

Second, there is no indication that law enforcement agencies/officials have done anything to curb forfeiture abuse. Not internally. There have been legislative reform efforts put in place in a number of states, but no one has taken this "valuable tool" away from law enforcement, no matter how much abuse has taken place. Finally, this directive makes forfeiture reform legislation mostly null and void, which means whatever was taken away by legislators as a result of law enforcement abuse, has been mostly reinstated by the DOJ's new rules. So, no law enforcement agency actually needs to worry about abusing themselves into a forfeiture-less future.

It's a bad op-ed supporting a terrible process -- a well-meaning program that's been abused past the point of recognition by law enforcement agencies. The nation as a whole is still 0-1 in national drug wars. Civil forfeiture hasn't changed that. All it's done is give the government more ways to take property from citizens.